A comparative study of defense reforms in eastern European nations by Lee, Chee Hoe Michael
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-12
A comparative study of defense reforms in eastern
European nations
Lee, Chee Hoe Michael










MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
 
 
A Comparative Study of Defense Reforms  




By:      Lee Chee Hoe Michael 
December 2010 
 
Advisors: Lawrence R. Jones 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
A Comparative Study of Defense Reforms in Eastern European Nations 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Lee Chee Hoe Michael 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number N/A.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis analyzes the defense reforms in transitioning nations in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. The 
objective is to compare the similarities and differences, as well as discern possible patterns of defense reform. To 
provide an analysis of this topic, literature on public management reforms will be studied to better understand the 
array of socio-economic, political and other factors, which may be involved in defense-oriented public management 
reforms. A proposed framework of different forces of reforms (influence) and the tides of reforms (purpose) will be 
developed to compare and analyze the defense reforms in different countries. The model could serve as a framework 
for future analysis of defense reforms in other parts of the world. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
135 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Defense Reform, Transformation, Professionalization, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Ukraine 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
 
 




Lee Chee Hoe Michael 
Ministry of Defense, Singapore 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  _____________________________________ 
   Lee Chee Hoe Michael 
 
  
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 




   _____________________________________ 
   Philip J. Candreva 
   Support Advisor 
 
    
   _____________________________________ 
   William R. Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEFENSE REFORMS  





This thesis analyzes the defense reforms in transitioning nations in Eastern Europe after 
the end of the Cold War. The objective is to compare the similarities and differences, as 
well as discern possible patterns of defense reform. To provide an analysis of this topic, 
literature on public management reforms will be studied to better understand the array of 
socio-economic, political and other factors, which may be involved in defense-oriented 
public management reforms. A proposed framework of the different forces of reforms 
(influence) and tides of reforms (purpose) will be developed to compare and analyze 
defense reforms in different countries. The model could serve as a framework for future 
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Throughout history governments have been drumming the beat of public reform, 
including defense-related reforms. These reforms could be described as tides of reforms, 
with desired outcomes to reduce wastages, promote efficiencies, improve accountability, 
or enhance adaptability in government agencies. They are constantly shaped and 
influenced by different reform forces due to changing political environments, socio-
economic conditions, internal pressures and unexpected events, which have significant 
impact on government, the public and even nations. For example, the end of the Cold 
War ushered in an era of economic growth in the 1990s through the mid 2000s in the 
European arena. This brought about pressures from both socio-economic and political 
forces to demand commensurate defense reforms, especially for transitioning nations in 
Eastern Europe. Fast-forward to 2010 where the world is facing a prolonged global 
recession since the burst of the United States housing bubble in 2007. However, 
widespread defense reforms appear to be continuing and even accelerating.  
Faced with continual downward pressures on defense spending and increasing 
international peacekeeping operations, many countries have already started reviewing 
their national security strategy and re-charting modernization plans for their armed 
forces. In addition, they have started exploring ways and means to use their defense 
dollars more effectively. As countries in Central and Eastern Europe continue to 
downsize into smaller armed forces, their focus will be shifted towards developing a 
smaller but flexible, responsive and professional military force to deal with the 
challenges in a changed security environment after the September 11, 2001 incident. At 
the same time, they are becoming more open to best practices and innovative ideas from 
the private sector for application in their armed forces, especially towards capability 
development. It is thus important to analyze the impact of emerging trends on future 
defense reforms.  
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The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of economic growth in the 1990s 
through the mid-2000s in the European arena. This brought about pressures from both 
socio-economic and political forces to demand commensurate public reforms, especially 
for the defense business in Eastern European nations. Fast-forward to 2010, where the 
world is facing a prolonged global recession since the burst of the United States (U.S.) 
housing bubble in 2007. The European Union (EU) has already agreed to cover up to 
USD 1 trillion of Greece’s accumulated debt. However, widespread defense reforms 
appear to be continuing and even accelerating. Many countries have already started 
reviewing their national security strategy and re-charting the modernization plans for 
their armed forces to deal with the economic challenges in a changed security 
environment after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
In Bulgaria, the armed forces are preparing for a major restructuring and force 
reduction as decreed in the 2010 White Paper on Defense. The Czech Republic has also 
set up a team of security and international relations experts to work on a White Paper on 
Defense, which is targeted for release in spring 2011. Poland is currently developing 
long-term modernization plans to fulfill the “Vision of the Polish Armed Forces 2030,” 
and a review of its national security strategy is expected to be completed in 2011.1 In 
October 2010, the British Prime Minister announced an 8 percent slash in the defense 
budget over the next four years. This will be accompanied by a drastic reduction in troop 
levels and military equipment purchases. One implication of the proposed defense cuts is 
that the British Armed Forces will have aircraft carriers with no jet fighters for the next 
                                                 
1. Jane's Military and Security Assessments, “Armed Forces: Poland,” posted July 19, 2010, accessed 





ten years.2 This announcement came despite the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) earlier warning to its allies on the possible implications in undermining 
transatlantic security, should they slash defense budgets as a quick fix in the current 
economic crisis.3 
B. PURPOSE 
This study examines the defense reforms in four Eastern European countries, 
namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine, by summarizing the relevant 
contextual and external variables, as well as the drivers for change since the end of the 
Cold War. The study will also propose a model to analyze reform similarities and 
differences and draw conclusions about possible patterns of defense reforms for 
transitioning countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The following research questions are addressed: 
 What is reform? 
 What are the different forces and desired goals in reform?  
 Who is involved in reform? 
 What are the forces and purpose of the defense reforms for the  selected group 
of countries? 
 What are the similarities or differences in the defense reforms among these 
countries?  
 Are there any emerging trends that could affect future defense reforms in 
Europe, especially for transitioning countries in Central and Eastern Europe? 
                                                 
2. Daily Mail Online, “Cut to the Bone: 25,000 MOD Staff and 17,000 from Armed Forces to Go in 
Defence Savings,” last modified October 19, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1321873/DEFENCE-REVIEW-Cameron-confirms-MoD-budget-slashed-8-cent.html.     
3. James G. Neuger “NATO Urged to Pool Weapons Purchases, Eschew Defense Cuts,” Bloomberg, 
accessed May 26, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aveITOiga7ms. 
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C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis includes: (1) a review of the literature on public 
management reform, (2) proposing a model to analyze defense reforms, (3) examining 
the defense reforms for the selected group of countries, (4) comparing the defense 
reforms across countries to identify similarities and differences, as well as emerging 
trends, and (5) an evaluation of the proposed model. 
2. Limitations 
This is a qualitative research study that analyzes and compares the forces that 
have influenced the flow of ideas, politics and interests behind defense reforms from the 
1990s till today, and the eventual reform outcomes. The information on the defense 
reforms for the selected group of countries was gathered from a variety of resources, 
namely websites, journals, books and periodicals. Primary sources include Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) websites for the respective countries, Jane’s Defense 
(http://www.janes.com), World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org), International 
Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm), previously completed theses, and 
other academic publications. The proposed model to analyze the defense reforms was 
developed based on existing literature on public management reforms. 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide a model to analyze and compare defense reforms across 
different countries. The case studies will form a database and facilitate future studies on 
the implications of defense reforms, especially for the transitioning countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
E.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
A review of the literature on public management reform and the proposed model 
for analyzing defense reform are covered in Chapter II. Chapters III to VI describe the 
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defense reforms in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine since the end of the 
Cold War. The analysis of the defense reform similarities and differences for the four 
countries, emerging trends, as well as an evaluation of the proposed model is presented in 
Chapter VII. Chapter VIII concludes the study with a summary, conclusions and 




II. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Defense management reform is a specific case of public management reform and 
any variation is a matter of degree among the reform factors. For example, international 
actors may play a more important role in defense reforms as compared with health care or 
social security reforms. To analyze the research, the author will examine the literature on 
public management reforms. This will help to better understand the array of historical, 
geographical, socio-economical, and political factors influencing public management 
reforms, which would also likely exist in defense management reforms. 
In this chapter, the author will examine how one can better understand public 
management reform. The chapter will first define what public management reform is. 
Next, it will examine the following question: why public management reform? This can 
be best answered by looking at the different forces and the desired goals and outcomes of 
such reforms. The paper will then move on to address the final question: who is involved 
in public management reform? In this section, the author will identify the participants and 
champions of public management reform and tie back to their interests in pushing for 
such reforms. At the end of the chapter, the author will propose a framework that can 
serve as a broad structure to compare and analyze public management reforms, including 
defense related reforms, across different countries. 
A. WHAT IS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
In the simplest definition, public management reform is about introducing 
changes to make government agencies operate better. From an academician’s perspective, 
the phrase could be better explained by breaking it into two components, namely public 
management and reform, to be looked at separately. 
Perry and Kraemer view public management as incorporating general 
management values, such as efficiency and effectiveness, as part of a government’s 
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mission in delivering public goods and services.4 On the other hand, Metcalfe and 
Richards define public management as the process in managing or guiding a whole set of 
interdependent organizations with a system of public governance.5 Public management 
could also be viewed as the activities that “buckle” government and civil society together, 
as highlighted by Pierre.6 Clarke and Newman add that public management is the 
implementation of political ideas to justify the allocation of resources and the creation of 
a distinct culture.7 Finally, König thinks of public management as a system that supplies 
public goods and services according to the priorities of government, yet influenced by the 
socio-economic or economic forces of society.8 One can draw several key points from 
these definitions.  
First, public management is concerned with the control of structures, processes, 
and activities to fulfill the mission accorded to government. This is similar to general 
management, except that public management involves a whole system of interconnected 
and interdependent organizations. Thus, managing public organizations often requires a 
high degree of cooperation and collaboration between departments and agencies, both 
within and outside of the government. Private organizations, on the other hand, need to 
be competitive to stay in the market.  
Second, public management is a complex process due to constant flux in the 
ideologies of how government should function. As different stakeholders within the 
unique socio-political environment attempt to influence the management ideas for 
government, this often results in multiple conflicting and ambiguous goals for public 
organizations. According to Nutt and Backoff, “the demand of interest group, flux in 
missions, and manipulation by important stakeholders and third parties” created the 
                                                 
4. James L. Perry and Kenneth L. Kraemer, Public Management: Public and Private Perspectives 
(California: Mayfield, 1983), x. 
5. Les Metcalfe and Sue Richards, “Evolving Public Management Cultures,” in Managing Public 
Organizations, ed. Jan Kooiman and Kjell A. Eliassen, (Oxford: Sage, 1987), 65–86. 
6. Jon Pierre, Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), ix. 
7. John Clarke and Janet Newman, The Managerial State (Oxford: Sage, 1997), ix. 
8. Klaus König, On the Critique of New Public Management (Speyer: Forschungsinst, 1996), 4, 59. 
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complexity in public management.9 The issue is further compounded as new leaders 
emerge from elections and, along with new appointments, disrupt existing plans and 
projects with their new ideas. In contrast, the ideas and values for private organizations 
are driven by a small group of board directors that tend to be clear and remained 
unchanged over a longer period of time.  
Third, goal ambiguity results in difficulty to establish clear, measurable, and 
specific performance indicators in public management. Private organizations, on the other 
hand, have clear “bottom-lines” and performance indicators; as the saying goes: “if you 
can't measure it, you can't manage it.” Public organizations often use generic proxies such 
as measuring input variables to evaluate performance. These proxies tend to be indirect 
measurements of performance and are usually vague. As a result, problems cannot be 
detected and corrected in a timely manner. Hence, politicians and senior public officers 
are constantly pushing for reforms to find the “right” fix for the government.   
Reform has become explicitly a political term in today’s society. Politicians often 
associate bombastic words, such as ‘transformation,’ ‘reinvention,’ ‘modernization,’ and 
‘improvement,’ when announcing reforms. While these words offer different 
connotations of change, are they reflective of the definition for reform? One way to 
examine this is to understand the different theories of organizational change. 
According to Ackerman,10 there are three types of change that are common in 
organizations: developmental change, transitional change, and transformational change. 
Developmental change is about improving something, which already exists in the 
organization, and the change is part of an incremental approach. Transitional change 
focuses on implementing something new. It is about moving the organization to a known 
new state that is identified by the organization. On the other hand, transformational 
change is revolutionary, as the impetus for change due to the organization’s failure to 
 
 
                                                 
9. Paul C. Nutt and Robert W. Backoff, Strategic Management of Public and Third Sector 
Organizations: A Handbook for Leaders (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 44.   
10. Linda S. Ackerman, "Development, Transition or Transformation: The Question of Change in 
Organizations," OD Practitioner 18, No. 4 (1986): 1–8. 
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deal with the current environmental demands. In the process of change, the organization 
emerges to an unknown new state from the “remains of the chaotic death of the old 
state.”11  
Rarely is transformational change in today’s government seen, as politicians are 
eager to see the results of reforms in the shortest possible time. More than often, reforms 
are about developmental change, where the intent is to improve or fine-tune some 
deficiencies in the current state. Other times, reforms are about transitional change, 
moving the organization towards the “more desirable” future state as envisioned by 
politicians. However, the question is how often are the results being measured against the 
desired outcome as proclaimed? The point is that reforms are merely frames of reference 
according to Dunn.12 To understand reforms, it is necessary to consider the claims, 
objectives, and actors involved in the process. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert summed it up by broadly defining public management 
reform as making “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector 
organizations with the objective of getting (in some sense) to perform better.”13 
Politicians will continue to use words like ‘transformation’ and ‘reinvention’. Therefore; 
it is important to uncover the motivations behind the reforms. This leads to the next 
question: why public management reform? 
B. WHY PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM? 
There are two perspectives in responding to this question. Scholarly literatures 
look for the desired outcomes as the reasons for public management reforms. As 
explained in the earlier section, the goal of public management reform is often about 
moving from the current state to a more desirable state. Examples of a desired state 
 
                                                 
11. Ackerman, "Development, Transition or Transformation: The Question of Change in 
Organizations," 8. 
12. William N. Dunn, “Policy Reforms as Arguments,” in The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis 
and Planning, ed. Frank Fischer and John Forester (London: UCL Press, 1993), 259, 270. 
13. Christopher Pollitt and Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16. 
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include having a government that operates with fewer resources, executes better quality 
public services, implements more effective policies, and provides greater transparency to 
taxpayers.  
1. Tides of Reforms 
According to Light, there are four philosophies of public management reforms, 
which he termed as the tides of reforms. Each tide of reform has desired outcomes that 
are driven by unique goals, focusing on a different set of products. It also motivates 
distinct groups of participants, which will be elaborated on in the next section. For 
example, if the desired outcome of public management reform were to have a more 
productive government, the reform would likely be the review of rules and structures 
(products) to focus on the improvement of the efficiency (goal) in government 
operations. The four tides of reform are summarized as below:  
a. Reform Tide of Scientific Management. These tides of reform categories 
 can be observed in many public management reforms, where the desired outcome 
 is to create a more productive and efficient government that works better, as 
 discussed in the previous example. 
b. Reform Tide of War on Waste. The reform tide of war on waste is another 
 common driver of public management reform. The goal of such reform is to cut 
 waste and save money by conducting audits and reviews of practices and findings. 
 Similar slogans or taglines to call for changes to create a more prudent 
 government that cost less would most certainly be heard during election periods.  
c. Reform Tide of Watchful Eye. As the name suggests, the philosophy 
 behind this reform tide category is to create a more transparent government that 
 provides greater visibility and accountability on its actions. The goal is to ensure 
 fairness and equity by providing the public, the media, and interest groups the 
 rights to access information. 
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d. Reform Tide of Liberation Management. The goal of such reform is to 
 reshape the government to achieve higher performance and greater adaptability. 
 This reform category usually focuses on the decentralization of decision-making 
 authority to employees, reengineering of programs, and redefinition of standards 
 to be customer-focused.14  
While Light uses the four tides of reforms to explain the different thinking or 
reasons that drive public management reforms, he recognizes that these tides of reforms 
overlap one another. More often, one tide will come in as another goes out. Light 
provides evidence from history to support this claim. For example, Andrew Jackson’s 
reform agenda was to restore accountability to the government through the reform tide of 
watchful eyes. This was in response to concerns about corruption that were not addressed 
in Thomas Jefferson’s earlier war on waste and liberation management.15 Thus, as one 
political party rides on a specific tide of reform, another agency will be mounting its 
efforts to launch another tide of reform. 
One critic of Light’s theory is that the four tides of reforms do not take into 
account the symbolic and legitimacy benefits of public management reforms. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert highlight that as the politicians and senior public officers announce reforms to 
the complex structures and processes within government, it is likely to create a positive 
effect on their reputation and career, with little immediate cost.16 Dunleavy describes this 
as “bureau-shaping” where senior public servants usually stand to gain from restructuring 
or redesigning the organization.17 Politicians and senior public officers therefore want to 
be seen as advocates of change, and constantly are on the lookout for ideas to introduce 
new reforms.  
                                                 
14. Paul C. Light, The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995 (Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1997), 15–43.   
15. Ibid., 15–17. 
16. Pollitt and Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 6. 
17. Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanation in Political 
Science (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
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2. Forces of Reform 
Pollitt and Bouckaert approach the question of why public management reform 
from a slightly different perspective. Instead of looking at the desired outcomes, they 
focus on analyzing the forces or pressures that drive and influence the reforms to achieve 
these desired outcomes. According to Pollitt and Bouckaret, there are four forces of 
public management reforms.18 
a. Socio-economic Forces. These refer to global economic forces and socio-
 demographic changes. For example, health care reforms have become important 
 in societies with aging populations and high inflation in health care costs.  
b. Political System.  The forces of the political system encompass the agenda 
 and new ideas from the political parties, as well as pressure from the citizens. For 
 example, in the U.S., the Democratic Party prefers an expansion of the 
 government’s role to improve public education, while the Republican Party 
 prefers private schools and economic incentives. 
c. Administrative System. These are internal pressures from within 
 governmental agencies to change the systems, processes, and structures governing 
 their operations and personnel. Pollitt and Bouckaret comment that the changes 
 from reforms that are driven by these internal pressures are usually on an 
 incremental basis. This is due to organizational complexities, such as interlocking 
 rules and regulations, fixed mindsets and culture that are created over a long 
 period of time. 
d. Chance Events. The aftermath of disasters and scandals within 
 government are always seen as good and valid reasons to call for new reforms. 
 The events of September 11, 2001, are a good example that resulted in an 
 overhaul of the U.S. government’s strategies, policies, and structures under the 
 George W. Bush Administration. 
                                                 
18. Pollitt and Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 24–38. 
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Pollitt and Bouckaert recognize that there is great interaction between the 
different forces of reform that influence the flow of ideas, politics, and interests behind 
public management reforms. For example, an aging population will likely result in 
citizens demanding for more subsidies and better quality healthcare services, expressed to 
the government through their politicians. The authors also acknowledge that the model 
still needs “a lot to be filled in.”19 Nonetheless, the forces of reform can serve as a 
starting point to identify the pressures that drive or influence the way public management 
reforms are being evolved, shaped, and finally implemented.  
C. WHO IS INVOLVED IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM? 
Having understood both the broad definition and reasons for public management 
reform, it is equally important to identify the participants involved. They can be broadly 
classified into three categories: public officers in the administration, politicians in the 
legislature, and other external stakeholders in civil society. Government employees will 
inevitably be involved in public managements reforms to some extent in their career. 
Politicians are usually the champions of public management reform, as they are elected to 
maintain the oversight of the government. Citizens are also indirectly involved in public 
management reforms by providing valuable feedback and justifications to their political 
representatives to launch new reforms. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert narrow the participants of public management reforms as 
“the people who supply the power, ideas or skills that drove or enabled the process of 
reform.” Besides politicians who are the most important actors in public management 
reforms, Pollitt and Bouckaert include senior civil servants, management consultants, 
independent think tanks, shadow government, and academic institutions that have great 
influence on public management reforms.20 This comes to no surprise, as the stakes for 
these groups can involve additional government funding, publicity for the next big 
management model or theory, and political presence in government. One observation by 
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Saint-Martin is that management consultants have been involved in almost every reform 
by the governments in the U.S., Australasia, and the United Kingdom during the 1980s 
and 1990s.21 
While Pollitt and Bouckaert have refined the different groups of participants of 
public management reforms, the question is how to relate each group (who) to the 
different reform agendas (why). Each group has their unique interests. Some will have a 
greater role and influence in public management reforms that focus on driving efficiency 
and economy, while others will be champions for reforms that call for greater 
transparency or performance in government. Light attempts to draw this linkage through 
his theory of the tide of reforms. He highlights that there are specific champions and 
participants of public management reform depending on the tide of reform.  
According to Light, the President and the executive branch are often the 
champions for scientific management and liberation management reforms. On the other 
hand, Congress will be in the driver’s seat for reforms that call for greater governance, 
which he terms as the tide of watchful eyes, in areas such as accountability, fairness and 
transparency. Congress has also been the biggest voice in declaring war on waste in 
government. As for the participants, namely experts such as management consultants and 
academicians, they are often engaged to help improve the productivity and performance 
of government, with internal participation from government employees. Conversely, 
interest groups, political think tanks, inspector generals, whistle blowers, and the media 
provide the ideas and required data to the politicians to drive reforms, in an attempt to 
create a more prudent and transparent government.22 
As the author re-examines the question of who is involved in public management 
reforms, one can almost argue that every citizen has some role to play, especially when 
the reforms impact the delivery of public goods and services. Hence, it is important to 
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identify the champions and key participants of public management reforms, as different 
groups bring forth different agendas and certain elements of biases that shape and 
influence the reforms.  
D. MODEL TO ANALYZE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Having examined the definition of public management reform, the reasons and 
forces driving reforms, and the principal actors involved, the next question is how to 
analyze public management reforms. In the process of analysis, potential questions raised 
include:  
 What are the forces and purposes of the public management reforms in a 
specific country?  
 What are the similarities and differences in the reforms when comparing 
between different countries?  
 Are there patterns of reform that are discernable among these nations?  
In this section, the author proposes a general model that will serve as a framework 
to compare and analyze public management reforms across different countries. 
Figure 1 shows the proposed general model, which is similar to the model by 
Pollitt and Bouckaert.23 Some changes are proposed, including the incorporation of the 
four tides of reform that were reviewed earlier in this chapter. These differences will be 
elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.  
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Figure 1. Proposed Model for Public Management Reform 
The four boxes A–D depict the forces of public management reform.24 Boxes A, 
B and D are as per the model by Pollitt and Bouckaert. Box A represents the socio-
economic forces, which are influenced by both global economic forces and socio-
demographic changes. Box B refers to the political forces that encompass the agenda and 
new ideas from political parties, as well as pressure from citizens. Box D relates to 
chance events that trigger the call for public management reform. While box C still 
represents the pressures from within government (due to internal deficiency or 
frustration) that call for reforms, it has been re-labeled from administrative system to 
internal forces for better representation.  
Another key difference is that box D is connected with box B and box C. Chance 
events often result in significant consequences that provide additional pressures on both 
political and internal forces, which hasten the process of public management reform. For 
example, the 9/11 incident has resulted in many drastic reforms carried out by both the 
Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress. Following the incident, Congress created the 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act in November 2001. The creation of TSA changed the way aviation security 
is carried out with the introduction of new measures and procedures, such as security 
screening of all luggage, federal air marshals, and liquid rules for carry-on luggage.25 
These new TSA measures have not only affected citizens in the U.S., they have also 
impacted worldwide travelers, with many other countries adopting similar practices. 
Internally within the U.S. Government, many departments were also going through 
reforms. At the Department of Defense, Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld laid out the 
transformation plans for the U.S. Military in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report. Some of the key changes included strengthening of joint operations, 
experimenting with new approaches to warfare, exploiting intelligence advantages, as 
well as the reform of the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) and the 
acquisition process to fight the “Global War on Terrorism.”26  
Similar to the model by Pollitt and Bouckaert, the proposed model has assumed 
that the decision-making process in public management reform is predominantly top-
down rather than a bottom-up approach. The assumption is that the conception and 
implementation of public management reforms are by a group of elites or senior officials 
in the administration and legislature, but they are influenced or perhaps at times pressured 
by the four forces of reform as described in boxes A-D.27 Box E thus lies at the heart of 
the author’s proposed model that represents the ‘political decision-making’ process, 
which is termed as the ‘elite decision-making’ process in Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model. 
However, box E has incorporated the four tides of reform as shown in the proposed 
model.28 This is another change to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s model, as the desired 
outcome(s) is one of the key determinants in the decision-making process for public 
management reform based on the above literature reviews. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the last section, the author has proposed a model to depict the forces of reforms 
and the interconnectivity between the different forces. In addition, the model has 
incorporated the desired goals and outcomes of public management reforms. One area 
that is lacking in the model is the different key actors involved in these reforms. One 
would probably have to infer the champions and participants by examining the tides of 
reforms and tie back to their interests in specific reforms.  
Nonetheless, the proposed model could serve as a broad structure to analyze 
public management reforms that have already shaped or are currently reshaping 
government. The proposed model could also be used to look at specific reforms in certain 
part of government, such as defense or health care reform. In addition, the proposed 
model could be used to compare public management reforms across countries, given the 
unique political and bureaucratic environments. Case studies on a variety of countries 
that have gone through significant reforms could be used to test and refine the proposed 
model. 
In the next few chapters, the author will examine the defense reforms in Bulgaria, 
Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic after the end of the Cold War. The author will 
apply the model to identify and compare the reform forces and tides of reforms in the 
defense reforms for these four transitioning countries in Eastern Europe.  
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III. DEFENSE REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA 
A.  COUNTRY PROFILE 
Bulgaria, known officially as the Republic of Bulgaria, declared its independence 
on November 10, 1989, after a successful coup to remove the Bulgarian Communist 
Party (renamed as the Bulgarian Socialist Party). Following that, Bulgaria implemented 
socio-economic initiatives and political reforms to transition into an open-market system 
and democratic society. The transition process was painful, as the newly formed 
government had limited mandate. Between 1990 and 1996, the power of the Bulgarian 
government was shared between two major political partiesthe Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and United Democratic Forces (UDF). As a result, it was difficult for the 
Bulgarian government to have any clear position on political, economic, or security 
issues.  
Bulgaria became the “worse managed country in Europe,”29 unable to provide 
necessary political goods such as security, education, health services, economic 
opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system 
to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and 
communications facilities to its citizens.30 Between 1990 and 1997, Bulgaria fell into 
economic crisis, averaging an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of -4.6%. 
1996 was the worst year for the Bulgarian society with the collapse of the Bulgarian 
national currency. In that year, GDP growth plummeted to -9.4%, coupled with 
hyperinflation.31 Given the political and economic instability, there were no major 
reforms or changes to the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) in the first eight post-
communist years.  
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The turning point for the political situation in Bulgaria was 1997. In the April 
1997 elections, the UDF and its allies won a comfortable majority to form a new 
government. The new government launched an ambitious reform package to stabilize the 
economy. They established a currency board and passed new legislation on banking and 
crime control, which won the approval of the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank. The Bulgarian economy began to stabilize with an average GDP growth rate of 
4.3% from 1998 to 2009, although inflation continued to hover around 7.4%.32 At the 
same time, the new government announced its intention to join NATO and the EU. This 
became the impetus to overhaul the BAF, which was very much in the same shape and 
form as during the Cold War period. Bulgaria eventually became a full member of NATO 
and the EU on March 29, 2004, and January 1, 2007, respectively, though most of the 
reform objectives were not met due to declining budgetary support in the 2000s. 
Currently, Bulgaria is reworking defense reforms plans based on the results released in 
the recent White Paper 2010. Today, Bulgaria is ranked 72nd in the world in terms of 
GDP and the World Bank classifies Bulgaria as an “upper-middle-income economy.”33 
B.  POLITICAL FORCES  
Political forces played an important role in driving defense reform in Bulgaria. 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Bulgaria implemented the westernstyle political system 
where political parties sought to represent politically significant social interests. There 
were more than 200 officially registered parties at that time. With the exception of the 
BSP and UDF, the rest of the political parties were poorly organized with low 
membership. Despite having some success, neither the BSP nor the UDF was able to 
achieve a majority at the 1990, 1991, and 1994 elections.34  
During this period, the political elites were described as “pretending to reform”35 
with primary focus on personal agendas, although there were some attempts to establish 
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civil control over the BAF. Examples include establishing the authorities between the 
President and the government over the military, as well as partially replacing key 
positions held by senior military officers in the MOD with civilians. Politics were also 
separated from the BAF by removing all communist influence and political party cells in 
the military. 36 However, the lack of clear regulations and understanding of the new civil-
military framework resulted in frequent clashes between the MOD and General Staff, 
especially on issues of downsizing and restructuring. There was also little discussion on 
defense matters at the parliamentary level due to lack of support and expertise. Hence, the 
Bulgarian parliament was unable to exercise effective legislative oversight of the BAF. 
In addition, the government, with domination by the BSP, did not have any clear 
direction on its foreign policy and national security strategy. The first attempt to define a 
national security strategy was the issue of the National Military Concept in 1995. The 
National Military Concept envisioned military security as “determined by the strategic, 
political, and military factors in the international environment on the one hand, and 
national military capabilities on the other.”37 While the National Military Concept had 
identified collaboration with international institutions as a component of its national 
security strategy, there was no consensus on Bulgaria’s geopolitical objectives on 
whether to lean towards Western Europe. Despite three rounds of NATO discussions in 
1996 on the possibility of including Bulgaria into the alliance, the Bulgarian government 
concluded that it did not want to pursue NATO membership. Without clear strategic 
guidance and goals, the BAF was unable to redefine its roles, doctrines and missions that 
were laid out since the Cold War era. Jeffrey Simon described this period as the “seven 
lost years” for Bulgaria.38 
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At the 1997 elections, the new government presided by the UDF came into power 
and brought about real democratic change in Bulgaria. Besides implementing economical 
reforms that brought about stability to the country, the government provided clear 
directions on foreign policy. It formally announced Bulgaria’s desire to join NATO and 
the EU, and all reform initiatives were geared towards achieving the top two priorities of 
the nation. Defense reforms also followed suit to ensure that Bulgaria fulfilled the criteria 
for membership, which included strengthening civilian control of the military, reforming 
of the BAF, and improving interoperability with NATO forces.  
Within that year, the government approved a three-stage Defense Reform 
Program, comprised of several reform tides. First, there was a reform tide of war on 
waste to reduce the military force size from 107,000 in 1997 to 65,000 by 2010. Second, 
the reform tide of watchful eyes was launched in 1998, with the creation of the Military 
Cabinet of the President and a Council for National Security to increase the capacity and 
expertise of civilian authorities in the area of national security. Third, the reform tide of 
scientific management and liberation management overlapped from 2001 to 2010 as the 
BAF strived to restructure into three corps: Rapid Reaction Corps and First and Third 
Army Corps. The new corps would be staffed with more professional soldiers and fewer 
conscripts (and a shorter serving period), and equipped with modernized military 
inventory as well as improved barracks and training facilities. The final goal of the 
Defense Reform Program was to have a small but combat-ready BAF with the ability to 
prevent small and medium conflicts, while at the same time interoperate with NATO 
forces.39  
In 2002, Bulgaria published its first White Paper, along with the first Defense 
Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria. These two documents were devoted to the reform of 
the BAF, interoperability with NATO forces, and the ultimate goal of joining NATO and 
the EU. However, these documents, including the ongoing defense reforms, were not 
developed with deep analysis or optimal consideration of the country’s economic ability 
to fund the modernization plans. As a result, the principal objectives set in the 2002 
White Paper were not achieved due to  
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…the combination of aspirational strategic thinking, fluctuating political 
will, underprepared professionalization of the Armed Forces and arbitrary 
self-interested decisions for purchasing new equipment, meant that the 
Armed Forces’ gradual process of building-up capabilities to a large extent 
never took place.40  
Nonetheless, the reform tide of war on waste did sweep the BAF, which will be 
elaborated in the section under ‘Internal Forces,’ and Bulgaria joined NATO and the EU 
on March 29, 2004, and January 1, 2007, respectively. 
In 2010, Bulgaria reviewed its defense strategy in light of the changes in the 
political, economic and security climate and came up with the second White Paper on 
Defense. Despite the absence of immediate external threats to its sovereignty, Bulgaria is 
concerned with regional security risks due to “…the existence of frozen conflicts, the 
actions of terrorist groups, sharp ethnic and religious disputes, high levels of organized 
crime, corruption and the illegal trafficking of weapons, narcotics and humans.”41 In the 
face of a global recession, Bulgaria requires a strategic rethink of its defense strategy and 
reform plans, as the country remains committed to the support of international UN, 
NATO and EU peace and security operations. 
Bulgaria’s White Paper 2010 calls for the reform tide of war on waste to continue 
in the medium term, with plans to reduce the BAF by about sixteen percent by 2014. This 
will result in the release of 5,700 military personnel and 1,300 civilian personnel over the 
next few years. The number of bases will also be reduced by 2014, with the proposal that 
the Air Force will operate from two instead of the current five bases, and the Navy will 
maintain a single headquarters, with two subordinate bases. Bulgaria’s only submarine 
will be retired42 (See the Appendix for the proposed changes to the structures of the 
Bulgarian Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy). In addition, about 800 to 900 buildings, 
with a total floor area of 400,000 square meters, will be released from the existing 8,500 
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buildings for other public needs by the end of 2014.43 Through the reform tide of war on 
waste, Bulgaria aims to free up financial resources to alleviate the massive obligations 
accumulated by the previous governments and to fund further transformation of the BAF.  
Under the reform tide of liberation management, the White Paper advocated a 
major overhaul of the structure of the BAF, starting from the administration of the MOD 
and the organization of top commanding structures. This top-down approach is in 
contrast with past reform efforts, which always started from the bottom and faded as it 
moved to the top. The White Paper proposed that defense management adopt a 
programming approach based on capabilities moving forward, and the Bulgarian MOD 
functions be expanded to  
…include the leading of projects related to defense and security; the 
analyses of needs in defense and operational capabilities; the development 
of plans and requirements for the development of the Armed Forces; the 
generation of strategic analyses; the formation of logistical provision 
policy for the Armed Forces, including securing the required resources for 
them; modernization and others.44  
At the operational level, the headquarters of the three services will be combined to 
create a single integrated structurethe Joint Forces Command, which is similar to the 
structure of other armed forces in NATO and the EU. The Joint Forces Command’s 
responsibility is to focus on joint functional integration of the three services, namely in 
areas of joint intelligence, joint operations, joint logistics, and communications. The Joint 
Forces Command will also oversee the joint operations centre, which will function as a 
national crisis centre to deal with crises and operations both within and outside of the 
country.  
To ensure a more efficient BAF, the White Paper proposed the following changes 
under the reform tide of scientific management. First, a territorial reserve, which will 
eventually make up eight percent of the total strength of the BAF by 2015, will be created 
to compensate for the proposed cuts in headcount. The reserve forces will be on a 
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voluntary basis in peacetime, providing support in humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations. However, during wartime the reserve forces will be mandatory for military 
deployments by the Minister of Defense.  
Second, the Bulgarian MOD aims to bring the defense expenditure on personnel, 
operations and maintenance, and investment from the current ratio of 75:24:1 to 60:25:15 
by the end of 2014.45 This will increase the per capita funding on military personnel by 
fifty percent, thus providing the BAF with modern equipment, as well as increasing the 
level of combat readiness and efficiency. It will also align Bulgaria’s defense spending 
profile to the standards of the rest of the NATO member countries. However, this will be 
dependent on the success of the reform initiatives under the reform tide of war on waste 
as mentioned earlier, as there are other cost and social implications involved in 
downsizing exercises.  
Third, Bulgaria will continue to take advantage of NATO’s Security Investment 
Program to modernize its existing installations, which include military airports and ports 
as well as communication and information systems. In 2009, the U.S. upgraded one of the 
four Bulgarian military bases, which is used for multinational combined exercises, at a 
cost of USD 6.5 million. This was part of the bilateral agreement signed between 
Washington and Bulgaria in April 2006, which included plans to refurbish two air bases 
and a depot in Bulgaria.46 The Bulgarian MOD also plans to increase its level of 
participation in international research and development projects in NATO and the EU to 
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GDP, it is likely that the Bulgarian modernization programs would be limited to 
equipment upgrades or donation of used equipment from allies in view of the huge 
outstanding obligations from past acquisition projects.47  
As highlighted by the BAF Defense Minister, “the White Paper answers one 
crucial question–what defence we need and what defence Bulgaria can afford.”48 The 
next step for the Bulgarian MOD is to develop the “Armed Forces Development Plan” 
and the “Long Term Investment Plan” to implement the proposals. As mentioned in the 
White Paper, one critical success factor for the reform of the BAF is the ability of the 
Bulgarian government and the MOD in combating corruption and conflicts of interest to 
avoid the mistakes of previous governments.   
C.  INTERNAL FORCES 
Internal forces have been present since the end of the Cold War, but no reform 
was carried out to reorient the structure and mission of the BAF from fighting traditional 
offensive wars to fulfilling a defensive role. Frequent changes in the Ministers of 
Defense, lack of political consensus over military goals and priorities, as well as the long 
time taken to formulate national security strategy documents were the key reasons that 
resulted in a BAF that was totally unprepared for integration with NATO. In addition, the 
capabilities of the BAF had degraded due to a limited budget. Between 1990 and 1996, 
the Bulgarian defense budget was around three percent of its GDP. In 1997–1998, it 
lowered to about 2.4% of GDP.49 
When the newly formed Bulgarian government started the Defense Reform 
Program in 1997, the BAF consisted of 107,000 personnel, which was the same level in 
the fall of 1991. On the other hand, Hungary had already reduced its forces from 120,000 
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to 52,000; Poland from 405,000 to 218,000; and the Czech Republic from 130,000 to 
58,000.50 In contrast, Bulgaria was way behind its neighbors in its reforms on the way 
towards NATO membership. Besides being overstaffed, the BAF officer structure was 
out of proportion. The ratio of senior-to-junior officers was at about 1.5 to 1, with an 
officer corps consisting of about 3,300 lieutenants and senior lieutenants, 3,570 captains, 
3,560 majors, 3,010 lieutenant colonels and 2,400 colonels.51 The officer corps was 
trying to keep the privileges that were inherited from the previous era. 
The war on waste reform tide continued with the downsizing of the BAF under 
the Defense Reform Program, and the reform tides of scientific management and 
liberation management quickened. In 1996, the reshaping of the functional and 
organizational structure of the BAF to be similar to that of NATO was completed. In the 
same year, a new strategy for developing the English Language Training and Testing 
System for 2006–2010 was approved. This strategy sought to ensure that the training and 
testing system for developing the English proficiency of the BAF officers was in 
accordance with the NATO standard STANAG-6001.52 Bulgaria also took advantage of 
available U.S. programs and sent its BAF officers to U.S. international military 
educational training programs, military-to-military teams, and the George C. Marshall 
Center.  
Having struggled to fulfill the criteria and eventually become a full member of 
NATO, the BAF faced new requirements. Plan 2004, which was approved in 1999, was 
only a short-term plan to reform the BAF and fulfill the necessary criteria for NATO 
membership. Hence, the BAF suddenly found itself lacking in many areas when 
participating in operations alongside NATO forces. First, the aging Soviet Union 
equipment used by the BAF was lacking in terms of interoperability and capability. The 
BAF had to bring their own ammunition and spares to repair their equipment when they 
participated in NATO missions. Second, most of the BAF officers were not proficient in 
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English to efficiently interact with NATO forces. Third, the BAF officers had less 
operational experience and exposure with NATO in terms of structure, training, troop 
rotation, and planning. Bulgaria only started contributing forces in July 1997 by sending 
a 35-man engineering platoon to participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). In 
comparison, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania had been working with 
the Implementation Force (IFOR)/SFOR since January 1996 with units at battalion 
strength. These internal forces called for the urgent transformation of the BAF into a 
modern mobile force capable of accomplishing their national defense mission, and also 
deployable abroad for NATO operations. 
Plans for modernization of the BAF were laid out in the Plan for Organizational 
Development and Modernization of the Structures of the Armed Forces until 2015. 
However, after the preliminary stage of implementation, the Bulgarian MOD concluded 
that it would be impossible to fulfill the scale and priorities of transformation envisaged 
in Plan 2015 due to the following challenges:  
 Insufficient defense resources to bridge the shortfall in capabilities to fulfill the 
assigned tasks and support the desired force size of the BAF.  
 Many existing structures, which were based on the concept of a static territorial 
defense of the past, were inefficient and outdated. 
 Lack of an integrated framework to coordinate the interaction and activities 
among the MOD, the General Staff, and the various services.  
 Lack of modeling and simulation tools to facilitate the decision-making process. 
For example, the existing financial system does not allow for effective 
prioritization of programs to derive the optimal investment for the BAF.53 
Among the challenges highlighted, the key problem that the BAF faced was the 
lack of sufficient resources to fund the reform initiatives due to financial mismanagement 
and the economic burden of the global financial crisis. In 2004, the BAF secured budget 
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approval of USD one billion for investment in eleven top priority projects through 2010. 
However, many of the programs, such as the armored personnel carriers and wheeled 
vehicles, have been deferred or put on hold. This is because a huge proportion of the 
future funding for the BAF has already been committed to the acquisition of new multi-
role fighters and new corvettes. In August 2010, the Bulgarian government had to draw 
on state reserves to pay for several contracts, such as transport helicopters and fixed-wing 
aircraft, armored utility vehicles, frigates and mine hunters, which ran into financial 
difficulties.54 The problem of mismanagement of financial resources had become so 
severe that the Bulgarian MOD “had only BGN 1,000 in its bank account” when the new 
government took over the ministry in October 2009.55  
Thus, amendments were made to the Plan 2015 with the reprioritization of the 
capabilities based on the relevancy to the highly probable risks and threats. One of the 
focus areas was to increase spending on combat training, which was in the region of 1.6% 
to 2.12%. This was considerably low in comparison with NATO’s target of about ten 
percent. To accelerate the pace of transformation, the BAF established the following 
principles in their program management:  
 Ensure the definition of requirements for modernization projects is in compliance 
with the necessary capabilities for the transformation of the BAF. 
 Establish integrated project teams consisting of highly qualified personnel to 
manage the projects.  
  Enforce procedures and requirements, such as law on public tenders, the 
regulation on its application, the ordinance on the terms and procedures for 
awarding special purpose public tenders, as part of project management.  
  Conduct long-term finance planning to support the modernization process. 
  Build and maintain long-term, mutually beneficial business relationships with 
defense industry companies in both national and international aspects.56  
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In 2010, the Bulgarian MOD reviewed its defense strategy and released the White 
Paper 2010 in response to the above challenges. 
D.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES  
Like many post-Soviet Eastern Bloc countries, Bulgaria found itself without any 
security cover with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact. In 
addition, Bulgaria lost the ability to acquire cheap fuel, spares and ammunition for its 
military, which resulted in rapid deterioration in its military equipment. With an economy 
that was heavily dependent on Russia, especially for imported oil and natural gas, 
Bulgaria faced tremendous geopolitical pressure from Russia.  
Sandwiched between Turkey and Greece, Bulgaria also had concerns that 
geopolitical conflicts could spill over to its borders. In particular, Bulgaria feared that the 
Turkish ethnic minority group would create problems if a Greek-Turkish conflict arose. 
The Turkish ethnic minority group comprised about ten percent of the Bulgarian 
population and was represented by the Movement for Rights and Freedom party in 
parliament.57 Joining NATO and the EU could provide the strategic solution to deal with 
these challenges, as Bulgaria would be part of a collective security and defense. In 
addition, Bulgaria could develop cooperation and agreements through the alliance with 
neighboring states such as Greece, Turkey, Romania and Macedonia to ensure stability in 
the Balkan region. The political elites and the public recognized the importance of joining 
NATO and the EU and supported the reforms, including those related to national 
security. 
Another socio-economic force facing the BAF was the declining population in 
Bulgaria. As shown in Figure 2, the population size of Bulgaria has been on a downward 
trend due to a high death rate and a declining birth rate. The proportion of males in 
Bulgaria has also reduced from 49.3% in 1990 to 48.4% in 2008.58 As a result, there were 
less available male conscripts to serve in the military. In addition, there is an increasing 
trend for countries to rely on a professional military force rather than conscripts to meet 
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the requirements of the twenty-first century. This is because of the legislative restriction 
for deploying conscripts for international operations, as well as the difficulties to build up 
and sustain the competency of conscripts within the short conscription period. On 
January 1, 2008, Bulgaria abolished the conscription system and introduced a reform tide 
of liberation management to move the BAF towards a professional military force.  
 
 
Figure 2. Population Trend in Bulgaria59 
E. CHANCE EVENTS 
After the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, it was clear that Bulgaria could not 
meet the criteria for NATO membership, as only Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic were invited for NATO’s first round of enlargement.60 However, the lack of a 
clear statement on the timeline for NATO membership at the Washington Summit in 
1999 frustrated the Bulgarian population and political elites. In addition, the appeal for 
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cooperation by NATO in response to the Kosovo Crisis was in conflict with national 
interests. Bulgaria had already suffered enormous economic losses supporting the UN 
restrictive measures and the embargo against Yugoslavia from 1990–1998. A 
sociological poll by the Alfa Research agency revealed that the support for Bulgaria to 
join NATO had gone down from 60 percent before the Kosovo War to 46%.61  
However, Bulgaria’s pro-western President Petar Stoyanov and Prime Minister 
Ivan Kostov saw the opportunity as a chance to strengthen Bulgaria’s bid to join NATO 
and the EU. The Bulgarian government fully supported the international efforts of NATO 
in the Kosovo Crisis by allowing NATO aircrafts to fly through Bulgaria’s airspace to 
attack targets in Yugoslavia from the east. The BAF also participated in the SFOR in 
Bosnia and the Herzegovina and Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
To speed up reform efforts, Bulgaria launched several reform tides. First, a new 
National Security Concept was issued in 1998. In the same year, U.S. President Clinton 
announced a new action plan for Southeast Europe. The plan consisted of intellectual, 
technical and financial support for the reform of the BAF, as well as concrete plans and 
projects for enhancing the security cooperation between Bulgaria and the U.S.62 Second, 
the Bulgarian government developed and approved the Military Doctrine and Plan 2004 
in 1999. These documents were based on the U.S. Defense Reform (Kievenaar) Study, 
which subsequently served as a basis of the plan for Bulgaria’s accession to NATO. 63 A 
NATO Membership Plan was also established in the same year. Third, Bulgaria initiated 
its first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in January 2003. Twenty-one working groups 
and committees were established, with experts from the Presidency, National Assembly, 
non-governmental organizations, NATO member countries, and the USEUCOM engaged 
in these working groups. The SDR process provided a structured framework to define 
national defense priorities in Bulgaria and as a result, new documents such as the Long 
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Term Vision for Development of the Troops and Forces 2015 and Plan for Organizational 
Development and Modernization of the Structures of the Armed Forces until 2015 were 
developed.  
F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Defense reform in Bulgaria only came about in the late 1990s after stabilization of 
the political environment. The desired outcome of defense reforms during this period was 
to ensure that Bulgaria fulfilled the criteria for Euro-Atlantic membership. Bulgaria 
eventually joined NATO and the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Following that, the 
pace of defense reform slowed down due to the lack of budgetary support, as a result of 
financial mismanagement and the prolonged economic recession in the later half of the 
2000s. Recognizing the changes in the political, economic and security climate, Bulgaria 
came up with the second White Paper on Defense in 2010 and is currently developing 
plans to transform the BAF to meet the security challenges in the twenty-first century.  
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IV. DEFENSE REFORM IN CZECH REPUBLIC 
A.  COUNTRY PROFILE 
The Czech Republic was the western part of the former Czechoslovakia during 
the Cold War. In the 1989 “Velvet Revolution,” the communist government in 
Czechoslovakia was overthrown in a non-violent strike across the country. After the 
breakup from the Soviet Union, the government of Czechoslovakia made a radical shift in 
its economic policies to lean towards the Western European countries so as to reduce 
export dependence from Russia. At the time, the government’s top priority was economic 
reforms to revamp the legislative policies and create a conducive environment to attract 
foreign investments. During this period, there was little discussion on defense reform, as 
the government’s attention was on building up the economy. Nonetheless, the political 
elites saw that incorporating into European collective defense structures was the most 
viable option for Czechoslovakia to meet the country’s defense needs. During President 
Vaclav Havel’s visit to NATO headquarters in March 1991, he welcomed NATO 
countries to cooperate and exchange information at different levels, especially in security 
matters with Czechoslovakia.64 In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary 
formed the “Visegrád Group” to jointly address security and foreign policy issues, with 
the objective of furthering their integration with Western Europe. 
Due to growing nationalist tensions, Czechoslovakia was peacefully divided into 
Czech and Slovak Republics on January 1, 1993. The Czech Republic government 
continued with its economic reforms and foreign policy, and in January 1994, the Czech 
Republic started the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. Two year later, the 
Czech Republic applied for EU membership. However, a currency crisis in May 1997 
caused economic growth to fall from 4.0% in 1996 to -0.7% in 1997.65 The collapse of 
banks and labor unrest, compounded by a catastrophic flood that affected the eastern part 
                                                 
64. Ladislav Holý, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, (United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 139. 
65. World DataBank, “World Development Indicators.”    
 38
of the country, brought about the biggest political crisis in the Czech Republic since the 
end of the Cold War. In response to the crisis, the government introduced two austerity 
packages and reduced government spending by about 1% of GDP in that year.66 
Subsequently, a restructuring agency was established and a revitalization program was 
adopted to accelerate legislative convergence with EU norms and the privatization of 
banks and utilities companies.  
The Czech Republic economy recovered in 2000. The government started to 
renew its interest in the armed forces after an invitation for discussion in 1997 concerning 
NATO accession. Along with Hungary and Poland, the Czech Republic became a full 
member of NATO on March 12, 1999. The Czech Republic subsequently attained its EU 
membership on May 1, 2004. Among the former communist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic has the one of the most developed and industrialized 
economies. Today, the Czech Republic is ranked 41st in the world in terms of GDP and 
the World Bank classifies the Czech Republic as a “developed country.”67 
B.  POLITICAL FORCE   
In the 1990s to early 2001, political forces were the key influence on defense 
reforms in the Czech Republic. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the government’s 
attention was on economic reforms. Security and defense were considered lower 
priorities as the threat of an invasion with military force had diminished. With the 
establishment of troops ceiling and limits on the amount of conventional armaments for 
NATO and Warsaw states under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Paris in 
1990, countries all across Europe and the U.S. started reducing defense spending and the 
size of their armed forces.  
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The government of the Czech Republic took the same route and launched the 
reform tide of war on waste, which saw the active closure of excess garrisons and the 
reduction in the defense budget and military forces. The government’s primary objective 
was not about the real reform of the armed forces but to save money to fund other 
economic initiatives. By 1997, the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), formed after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, had been reduced by 35% from 132,000 personnel in 1993 
to about 86,000 personnel, and subsequently to about 78,600 in 1999.68  
During the same period, an attempt to implement the reform tide on watchful eyes 
was also observed. However, the outcome was less than satisfactory. In an attempt to 
assist the democratization process in the Czech Republic, the U.S. invested a lot of 
resources to engage the ACR, which included military exchanges, accepting thirty to fifty 
ACR officers annually for the International Military Education Training program, and 
sending a Military Education Team to conduct seminars and workshops in the Czech 
Republic. The ACR reciprocated the efforts and granted the Military Liaison Team to set 
up its office in the corridor of the Chief of General Staff.69  
Despite all efforts, the democratization process for the ACR was slow. First, 
President Václav Havel, who was in office from 1993 to 2003, “…is neither well-versed 
nor well staffed in national security affairs.”70 While President Havel had been a strong 
advocate for the Czech Republic to join NATO, he as the Commander-in-Chief showed 
little interest in the transformation of the ACR after the strategic goal was achieved. 
Second, the General Staff continued to dominate and influence the decision-making 
process in defense matters despite a civilian control system that was in place for oversight 
of the ACR. This was due to the lack of defense expertise from the civilian components 
of the national security structure, such as the parliamentary bodies, non-government 
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institutions, and the media.71 As a result, there were limited active oversight of the ACR 
and national debate on national security issues such as the reform of the ACR.  
Until NATO accession, the ACR did not attract political interest, which made it 
possible for other parties to attain the post of Defense Minister from the ruling party. 
From 1993 to 2001, six defense ministers were appointed but none of them was able to 
make impactful changes to the ACR. Given their limited influence in the political 
process, the defense ministers were often unable to lobby sufficient support and resources 
to implement their reform initiatives. For instance, the implementation of the concept for 
ACR development in 1996, which was drafted in 1993, was delayed due to budget 
constraints.72 The constant change in defense ministers also made it difficult for the 
military leaders to forge a consensus on military strategy and goals. The military 
leadership in the General Staff perceived that the civilian-military leadership represented 
the interests of various political parties and were not enthusiastic about defense reforms. 
On the other hand, the civilian-military leadership viewed that the General Staff was not 
willing to carrying out reforms that “…threaten its institutional interests.”73 
As the result of the above political forces, there was a decline in the level of 
combat readiness and the quality of personnel in the ACR, which later resurfaced as 
internal forces for defense reforms in the 2000s.  
C. INTERNAL FORCES 
Internal forces played an important role in driving the defense reforms that led to 
today’s professional armed forces in the Czech Republic. After attaining NATO and EU 
membership in 1999 and 2004 respectively, the ACR found itself with increasing military 
operations abroad, especially after September 11, 2001. These include participation in the 
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EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan, 
SFOR in Iraq, AFOR in Albania and Turkey, as well as other humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, Pakistan, Central Africa and Lithuania.74 For a 
military force that had not experienced any fundamental changes other than the reform 
tide on war waste since the end of the Cold War, the ACR faced challenges in coping 
with these operations.  
First, the ACR’s military equipment and concepts were outdated in the new 
security environment. The aging military equipment, inherited from the Soviet Union era, 
was incompatible with NATO forces and was becoming an increasing burden to the 
ACR. Also, its military doctrines and strategies, developed for traditional large-scale 
offensive warfare in the Cold War era, were not suited for multinational peacekeeping 
operations. Second, the ACR personnel did not have the competent skills to effectively 
interoperate with NATO forces. The decreased budget had led to ineffective preparation 
and insufficient training for the deployed forces. In 1993, the defense budget was at 2.4% 
of GDP. It was reduced to 2.0% in 1999, with a low of 1.7% during the financial crisis in 
1997.75 The biggest issue was that there was no system in place to train and test the 
English language proficiency of the ACR personnel. Third, the ACR was facing problems 
in recruiting and retaining military personnel, with the two reasons being poor prestige of 
the military and improving labor market conditions. Due to the lack of military housing, 
many ACR specialists had left the military after several years of commuting. Fourth, 
there existed double standards within the ACR. Personnel in NATO missions were highly 
appreciated and equipped with the best equipment, while the forces back home had to 
deal with poorer conditions and shortages in equipment.  
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Karel Pezl described the ACR’s status as one that did not correspond to both the 
current common needs and long-term potentiality of the Czech Republic. It was 
inflexible, sometimes even incompetent with undefined internal responsibility.76 In 2000 
and early 2001, the Czech Republic received negative assessments from NATO and 
defense evaluators from the U.S. In particular, NATO took the Czech Republic to task for 
not fulfilling alliance commitments.77  
On May 14, 2001, the Czech Republic established the Center for Preparation of 
Czech Armed Forces Reform, marking the beginning of a series of reform tides. A plan 
to transform the ACR into a small, sustainable and responsive armed force by the end of 
2010 was developed and approved by the government in the same year.78 A summary of 
the key objectives for the different phases of the reform is as follows: 
i.  Preparation phase (2001 to end of March 2002) – develop the documents 
 for the “Concept of Build up the Professional ACR” and a “Concept of 
 Mobilization of the ACR.”  
ii.  Phase I (2002 to 2003) – restructure top management and military 
 command bodies, base closures, and unit relocations. 
iii.  Phase II (2004 to 2005) – complete the professionalization of NATO 
 assigned forces. Start modernization projects for the first group of priorities. 
iv.  Phase III (2006 to 2007) – achieve initial operation capabilities of 
 professional armed forces, with the completion of modernization projects for the 
 first group of priorities. Start modernization projects to increase combat 
 capabilities of mechanized divisions. 
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v.  Final phase (2008 to 2010) - complete implementation of modernization 
 projects to increase air force and air defense combat capabilities and achieve full 
 operational capabilities.79 
In this reform plan, greater emphasis was on the reform tide of liberation 
management, although the four reform tides overlapped one another through these 
proposed key deliverables:  
 Creation of a Training and Doctrine Command that will provide consistent 
training and doctrines across the forces. 
 Establishment of a Joint Operations Center. 
 Human resource models for standardized position descriptions, structure 
designs (manning requirements), compensation levels (linkage of pay to 
grades/ranks), advancement, recruiting goals, and marketing details. 
 Training plans for the professional development of officers and non-
commissioned officers. The training system was designed in corporation with 
the Training and Doctrine Command of the U.S. Army, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia. 
 Activity-based costing model for decision-making, allocation, and 
management of resources.  
 Modern garrisons that will meet the needs of a professional army. Wherever 
possible, units will be stationed close to training areas to make their training 
program as efficient as possible.  
 A peacetime strength of 34,000 to 36,000 military personnel and less than 
10,000 civilians (and a total wartime strength of 1.8 times the peacetime 
strength).80 
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As described by Marie Vlachova, the implementation of defense reform was “no 
walk through a rose garden”.81 Faced with the economic toll of the catastrophic flood in 
2002 and the global economic crisis, 103 projects were reduced by CZK 1.3 billion, and 
another 54 projects totaling CZK 631 million were cancelled in a re-evaluation exercise 
in 2003.82 The existing reform plan was also replaced by the “Conception for Building a 
Professional Army of the Czech Republic” in 2003, which reduced the total planned 
future spending by CZK 75.2 billion. In addition, the new reform plan specified that the 
future Czech Republic defense budget would no longer be based on a certain percentage 
of the GDP, but be set at a level that would be “consistent with successfully 
implementing the transformation programme.”83 From 2006 onwards, the defense budget 
went below 1.9% of GDP as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.   Defense Spending Trend for ACR from 2000 to 201084  
To continue with the modernization efforts given the limited resources, new 
projects related to improvement of operational capabilities could only be initiated in 
limited numbers. In addition, the ACR had significantly reduced the proportion of 
program financing for immovable infrastructure programs to fund armament programs. In 
2005, 27.1 % and 69.7% of the program financing were for immovable infrastructure and 
armament programs, respectively. From 2008 onwards, the proportion of program 
financing for armament programs had gone up to 86%, with the immovable infrastructure 
at 9-11%. Nonetheless, the completion date for achieving the full operational capability 
has been deferred to 2018.85 
To lower operating costs, the Czech Republic and fourteen other NATO 
members86 signed a memorandum of understanding under the Strategic Airlift Interim 
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Solution at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit to share the cost of six An-124-100 transport 
aircraft permanently earmarked for NATO operations.87 Subsequently, the Czech 
Republic signed a declaration of intent with eleven other EU members88 on November 
10, 2008, to pool aircrafts, such as the C-130 and the A-400M airlifter, and associated 
functions and services to establish the European Air Transport Fleet.89 One notable 
accomplishment was that the ACR has achieved its downsizing goals. As of January 1, 
2010, the total strength of the ACR was 32,153, including 9,017 civilians.90 
Faced with increasing pressure from the opposition to demand an end of the 
ACR’s participation in international operations in light of poor economic conditions, the 
Czech Republic’s defense budget of 1.32% of GDP in 2010, in comparison with 2.25% in 
1999 when it joined NATO, has reached its historical low. The Czech Republic has 
already set up a team of fifteen security and international relations experts to work on a 
White Paper on Defense, which is targeted for release in spring 2011. However, some 
analysts have questioned the competence and composition of the team that is in charge of 
drafting the White Paper, in view that many of them have little or no security expertise. 
Nonetheless, the reform tides of war on waste and scientific management can be expected 
to continue in the medium term, given that a large part of the White Paper will be 
focusing on the reduction of force size and the improvement of the capability of the ACR 
to continue its participation in multinational operations.91  
D.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES 
A socio-economic force facing the ACR was the changing demographics in the 
Czech Republic. First, the population growth rate had been relatively stagnant since the 
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Czech Republic declared its independence in 1993. Between 1994 and 2004, the average 
population growth was at -0.1% per annum.92 The result was a smaller pool of males 
available for compulsory military service, and this was highlighted as a major concern in 
the documents for the reform of the ACR. Second, there was an increasing trend of young 
people opting for alternative civilian service over compulsory military service. The 
alternative civilian service option was introduced after the “Velvet Revolution” in 1989 
to enable young people of specific religions and pacifistic beliefs to serve their country 
without the use of weapons. In 2000, only 15.5% of the college students reported for 
military service.93 Third, there was increasing public pressure to shorten or perhaps 
eliminate the service period for conscripts. From an economic point of view, conscription 
is a social burden for a country and abolishing it would benefit the civilian labor market. 
Also, the conscription system does not meet the new requirements of the ACR, as 
conscripts cannot be deployed abroad for NATO or UN operations.  
As these issues continue to manifest, a reform tide of liberation management is 
expected, and some initiatives under this reform tide have already been rolled out. In 
2001, the Czech Republic announced a plan to transform the ACR to an all-volunteer 
force and reduce compulsory military service from 24 to 18 months. Three years later, 
compulsory military service was abolished and the ACR was transformed into a fully 
professional, all-volunteer military organization on December 31, 2004.  
E. CHANCE EVENTS  
The Czech Republic has a temperate continental climate. In spring, the varied 
temperatures and weather can bring about high water levels in the rivers from the melting 
snow, resulting in occasional flooding. In 1997, besides the financial crisis, the Czech 
Republic experienced heavy rains, which overfilled the rivers and caused massive floods 
in the southern part of the region. Within a 10-day period in July 1997, 50 people 
drowned, 80,000 evacuated, and 11,000 lost their homes. In addition, 51 road bridges, 15 
railways bridges, and long sections of roads and railways were destroyed, with the 
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damage amounting to USD 1.8 billion.94 In August 2002, the country was once again 
devastated by another catastrophic flood. Seventeen people were killed and the damage 
amounted to USD 3.7 billion.95  
Historical events such as the occupation of the country by the Germans in World 
War II and subsequently by Warsaw Pact forces in 1968 had resulted in a poor 
relationship with society. However, through the floods of 1997 and 2002, the public 
image of the ACR had slowly improved. The Czechs remembered that no one helped 
them like the way that the military did during the floods. The ACR cooperated with the 
Czech Republic Police in evacuation and rescue operations, which involved many 
soldiers, engineers and helicopters. The ACR also demonstrated their professionalism by 
their outstanding performance in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. In 1999, the 
ACR provided military assistance after the earthquake in Turkey.96 Over time, the public 
and political elite saw the importance of the new role of the ACR and become more 
supportive of the defense reforms to build up its humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations capabilities.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In the 1990s, the pace of defense reform was slow due to lack of political interest 
and defense expertise in the Czech Republic. During that period, the government’s 
attention was on economic reforms, as the threat of a traditional military invasion by 
neighboring countries was almost non-existent. After joining NATO and the EU, the 
Czech Republic realized that the state of the ACR required a total transformation to cope 
with the increasing alliance commitments. The negative assessments from NATO and 
U.S. defense evaluators in the early 2000s served as a wakeup call for the Czech 
Republic to carry out its long overdue defense reforms. However, the government was 
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forced to reduce defense spending to manage the deficits in the aftermath of several 
catastrophic floods and the prolonged global economic recession. The Czech Republic is 
currently working on a White Paper to review its national security strategy and the 
defense reform plans.  
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V. DEFENSE REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND 
A. COUNTRY PROFILE   
Poland, known officially as the Republic of Poland, ended its communist regime 
on January 30, 1990. Beginning at the point of independence, there were strong political 
and public support for the strategic purposes and new directions of Polish foreign policy, 
which were primarily based on two key principles. First, Poland would develop peaceful 
bilateral relations with neighboring states through mutual cooperation. Second, Poland 
would gradually integrate with NATO and the EU.  This support signaled an important 
assumption that NATO, as a collective defense structure, would be the main guaranty of 
security in Europe.97 Hence, Poland’s immediate priorities after the revolutions of 1989 
were to end its Warsaw Pact obligations and establish new security agreements. In 
February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary formed the “Visegrád Group” to 
jointly address security and foreign policy issues as a bid to further their integration with 
Western Europe. In late 1991, Poland secured Russia’s agreement to remove all Russian 
combat forces stationed in Poland by the end of 1992, with the rest of the support forces 
to be withdrawn by the end of 1993.98  
Fulfilling the criteria for membership in NATO and the EU thus became the next 
top priority for Poland. In 1994, Poland participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace 
program and embarked on a democratization campaign, which included redefining its 
civil-military relationship. However, frequent changes in the Polish parliament with 
instability within the political parties, coupled with the priority of economic reforms over 
defense requirements, resulted in slower than expected democratic reforms in the Polish 
Armed Forces (PAF) in the early 1990s.  
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On March 12, 1999, Poland, along with the other two members of the Visegrád 
Group, joined NATO as a full member. With increasing obligations as a new member of 
the alliance, Poland started its second phase of defense reform to improve defense 
management and modernize the PAF, though progress was delayed in the early 2000s due 
to poor economic conditions. In 2009, Poland abolished conscription service and the PAF 
transformed into an all-volunteer professional force. 
Poland’s economy has also undergone significant transformation since the end of 
the Cold War. In 1990, the government introduced a shock therapy program to transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Initiatives that were 
implemented included the privatization of state-owned companies, elimination of price 
controls and subsidies, incentives for foreign investments, and tightening of monetary 
policy to combat inflation. On May 1, 2004, Poland became a member of the EU. Within 
a span of 19 years, Poland’s GDP has jumped by almost 900% from USD 59 million in 
1990 to USD 529 million in 2008.99 Today, Poland is ranked 21st in the world in terms of 
GDP, and the World Bank classifies Poland as a “developed country.”100 
B. POLITICAL FORCES  
Political force is one of the main driving forces of defense reform in Poland. From 
1989 to 1997, a reform tide of watchful eyes swept the PAF as “membership in NATO 
and WEU was recognized as strategic purpose of Poland in 90’s.”101 Defense reforms 
that were introduced focused on fulfilling the criteria for accession to NATO, which was 
establishing democratic standards of civilian control over the PAF and the defense 
budget. The democratization process started with the appointment of two civilian deputy 
ministers in the MOD in April 1990. In December 1991, the Polish parliament took back 
the responsibility of approving the defense budget and setting laws on defense matters 
from the military and appointed the first civilian Defense Minister. However, several 
problems started to surface.  
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First, the budget approval process was inefficient due to the multitude of political 
interests, lack of expertise in defense matters, and the priority of economic reforms over 
military issues. These resulted in severe cuts in the defense budget between 1989 and 
1993.102 Second, the unwillingness of the military to be subordinated to the 
inexperienced civilian authority created obstacles in the democratization process.103 After 
the split of the MOD into two separate entities, namely the military General Staff and the 
civilian MOD, the General Staff restricted ministerial access to military resources and 
information. Hence, the General Staff became a semi-independent institution and had a 
huge influence on the decision-making process for defense policy matters.104 Third, the 
Small Constitution in 1992 created a dual executive system where the Polish parliament 
and President shared the control of national defense as well as internal and foreign 
affairs.  
The unclear line of authority over the PAF resulted in disputes between the 
President and parliament. Distrust between the ministry and the military started to grow, 
as the President established an informal political alliance with the Chief of the General 
Staff. It took the country several highly publicized political scandals, which will be 
elaborated under the section ‘Chance Events,’ to finally establish the structures and 
responsibilities between the MOD and the General Staff. To increase its expertise of the 
defense budget and exhibit better control of it, the Polish parliament set up the Budget 
Studies Division, and Poland had its first parliamentary debate on defense issues in 
February 1995. By 1999, Poland was ready to join NATO.  
Having become a full member of NATO in 1999, Poland was obligated to 
contribute forces to the Allied Forces Central Europe, as well as increase defense 
spending to 2.2% of GDP and focus its defense spending on modernizing the PAF to 
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achieve interoperability with NATO.105 Within that year, Poland provided one division of 
its air combat squadron to NATO, and together with the contributions from Germany and 
Denmark, the Multinational Corps Northeast was formed. The next step for Poland was 
to reform its military. 
In January 2000, the Polish parliament approved the “Security Strategy of the 
Polish Republic.” Following this, Poland attempted to launch the reform tides of 
scientific and liberation management with the “Programme of Restructuring and 
Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001–2006.” 
Minimum levels of defense spending were established for 2001–2006, and the ratio of 
expenditures on military equipment to total defense spending was planned to increase 
from around 8.3% in 2000 to 23% in 2006.  
Due to revised economic conditions in the early 2000s, the Polish parliament had 
to make amendments to the program in October 2002. The minimum levels of defense 
expenditures were cancelled and the ratios of expenditures on arms equipment to total 
defense spending were revised downwards.106 In addition, the assigned 1.95% of GDP 
for defense spending as defined in the “Programme of Restructuring and Technical 
Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2003–2008” was redefined 
to include both the defense budget and all other defense-related expenditures financed by 
other parts of the state budget. This signified further downward pressure in the overall 
level of defense spending in Poland. Also, the focus had been shifted to the reform tide of 
war on waste with its downsizing efforts and cost-cutting initiatives that were started by 
internal forces (see the next section titled ‘Internal Forces’). As a result, several 
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modernization programs were delayed, military supplies were depleted, and 
improvements in social conditions for servicemen were not carried out.107 
The September 11 incident in 2001 changed the global security environment and 
Poland soon found itself involved in more peacekeeping missions under NATO and the 
United Nations. In 2003, Poland participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom where Poland 
commanded the Multinational Force in south-central Iraq. At the height of the operation, 
2,500 Polish soldiers were deployed in Iraq. Recognizing the increasing responsibilities 
and operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Polish Prime Minister re-launched the 
reform tides. In October 2004, the Prime Minister directed the MOD to initiate the first 
permanent SDR since the independence of Poland in 1990. The objective of the SDR was 
to provide strategic directions for a future defense system that were coherent and 
consistent with national and alliance strategic intents, and more importantly were 
affordable based on the economic possibilities of Poland.108 The result was the Defense 
Plan 2005 to 2010, which outlined the plan to increase professionalization to 65 percent 
of the defense force by 2010. Several key reform initiatives were rolled out primarily 
under the reform tides of scientific and liberation management. 
In the area of personnel reform, three new professional corps, namely the 
professional private corps, non-commissioned officer corps and officer corps, had already 
been established under the “Professional Military Career Law” in 2004. Through the 
reform tide of liberation management, new education and training centers were set up for 
each of the corps, and the soldiers’ evaluation system was redesigned to be based on 
knowledge, skills, and practical achievements. A structured career planning process was 
also put in place for overseas graduates, especially for those that had undergone training 
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in western military institutions.109 The conscription service was suspended in 2009 and a 
new National Reserve Force of 20,000 personnel would be created in 2010. 
With increasing deployment to the Afghanistan International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), the PAF had to accelerate the reform tide of liberation management and 
increase the investment budget from 13.2% of the defense budget in 2001 to 23.3% in 
2007.110 Through technical upgrades and equipment replacement, the PAF has built up 
its expeditionary and civil-military co-operation capabilities with its modern fleet of 
armored tanks, aircrafts, and naval vessels. One major acquisition program was the F-16 
Program, which was funded outside the defense budget from a designated reserve. The 
PAF have also invested resources into integration and networking of command and 
control (C2) assets to enhance its effectiveness. Recent acquisition of multi-band and HF 
tactical radios for Poland’s Land and Special Operations Command Forces has provided 
the PAF with secure communications to interoperate with NATO forces. Ongoing 
modernization projects include the deployment of a new air defense missile system by 
2012, replacement of the helicopter fleet by 2018, and other procurement projects such as 
vehicle simulators, C4ISR systems, spike anti-tank guided missile launchers and 
Rosomak armored modular vehicles.111  
In May 2009, the Minister of Defense approved a new structure for the PAF that 
was laid out in the 2009–2012 Defense Plan. The Defense Plan will encompass the 
reform tides of liberation management and scientific management to transform the PAF 
into a smaller but “modern, digitized and networked organization, capable of conducting 
both effective homeland defense and being a reliable ally participating in international 
missions modern and flexible military force.” This will be achieved by increasing the 
number of combat-orientated units of the PAF from 53% to 62% over the next few years. 
There will also be lesser garrisons, down from the current 126 to 99 by the end of 2018, 
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with most of them concentrated around key training areas and out of large cities. In 
addition, the amount of modernized equipment will be up from 26% in August 2009 to 
35% at the end of 2012.112  
This is a relatively ambitious plan considering the uncertain economic conditions 
and increasing new requirements. Poland was the lead nation in the EU Battlegroup 2010, 
and will be the lead nation again for the EU Weimar Battlegroup, which is scheduled to 
turn operational in the first half of 2013. Poland is also currently in the consultation phase 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine to form the Vyshegrad Battle 
Group.113 In addition, the rising cost of recent operations, especially the deployment to 
the Afghanistan ISAF, has threatened to disrupt the modernization process. Annually, 
Poland spends about USD 1 billion, which constitutes about 10 percent of its defense 
budget, to finance the 2,600-member contingent in the Afghanistan ISAF. Polish 
President Bronislaw Komorowski highlighted that “the costs of out-of-area operations are 
so significant, that they are having an effect on the process of technical modernization of 
the armed forces.”114 Acknowledging these constraints in the midst of a changing 
security environment, the PAF is currently developing long-term modernization plans to 
fulfill the “Vision of the PAF 2030,” which was evolved from the 2009/2010 SDR.115 
The national security strategy, adopted since 2003, is also currently under review and will 
be completed in 2011.116  
C. INTERNAL FORCES   
The first internal problem that the PAF faced in the early post-communist years 
was the shortage of critical military spares and materials. During the Warsaw Pact era, 
Poland acquired military equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union at low prices due 
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to its strategic position in the alliance. This preferential treatment ended when the Cold 
War was over. In 1989, the Soviet Union broke its long-term defense contracts with 
Poland, while at the same time raised prices to world market levels. Shortly thereafter, 
with the German reunification, Poland’s naval cooperation contracts with East Germany 
also ended. As a result, there was shortage of military components and the PAF had to 
resort to cannibalization to maintain its equipment. At the same time, Poland was 
urgently looking for a source of conventional warheads, as Soviet forces had removed the 
nuclear warheads from Scud and other Warsaw Pact missile batteries when they 
withdrew from Polish soil.117 The situation was made worse with the huge defense 
spending cuts by the Polish government.  
Radek Sikorski described the 1990s as “probably the most demoralizing period in 
the recent history of the Polish army.”118 Despite constant assurance from the 
government to fund the modernization of the PAF, the outcome was more budget 
reductions. In 1990, the Polish defense budget was at 2.6% of GDP. By 1999, it had 
fallen to below 2 percent of GDP, reaching a low of 1.8% in 2000.119 In addition, the 
need to fund a huge military force “inflated by the communist legacy of redundant 
bureaucracy filled with senior leaders” left little funds for training and maintenance.120  
In the first part of 1992, more than 80 percent of the defense budget went to personnel 
costs. With an increasing inventory of obsolete equipment and a demoralized force, the 
PAF was unable to perform any operations outside its borders. This became a grave 
concern for the government, as Poland would not be able to establish any military 
cooperation and advance its integration with NATO.  
In September 1997, the “Programme for Integration with NATO and 
Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998–2012” was approved. A reform tide of 
war on waste was launched to reduce force size and excess inventory in order to fund 
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new investment programs. During the economic downturn in the early 2000s, the reform 
tide of war on waste was intensified under the “Programme of Restructuring and 
Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001–2006.” 
This resulted in the retirement of over 800 tanks, 450 artillery guns, 60 aircrafts and 
2,900 transport vehicles,121 as well as the conversion of thirty-one military installations 
to civilian installations and the consolidation of fourteen training schools into three 
academies.122 In 1999, the PAF had reduced its force size from about 400,000 personnel 
in 1989 to about 285,000 personnel.123 As of January 2010, there were 100,412 personnel 
in the PAF.124  
To address the concerns related to the lack of an alternative source of arms 
supplies and high procurement costs, Poland launched a reform tide of scientific 
management by introducing a program in 1992 to develop the domestic defense industry. 
Defense industry plants, which had produced Soviet-compatible armaments, established 
joint ventures and production projects with Western firms to develop and produce critical 
military equipment.125 Today, much of the PAF equipment such as the KTO Rosomak 
armored vehicles, WR-40 Langusta self-propelled multiple rocket launchers, PZL 
helicopters and aircraft trainers are produced domestically.  
Poland has also entered into joint procurement agreements with its allied partners 
to enable military capabilities at a lower cost. At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Poland 
and fourteen other NATO members126 signed a memorandum of understanding under the 
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution to earmark six An-124-100 transport aircraft 
permanently for NATO operations.127 On October 1, 2008, Poland together with nine 
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other NATO members,128 as well as Finland and Sweden, signed a Strategic Airlift 
Capability agreement to pool resources to purchase and operate three C-17 transport 
aircrafts.129 Through these initiatives, Poland was able to build up its required military 
capabilities and modernize the PAF at a lower cost. 
D.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES   
After the fall of communism, Poland was faced with the challenge of putting in 
place controls to manage the huge military force stationed in Poland. During the Cold 
War, Poland had the largest armed forces in the Eastern Bloc after the Soviet Union.130 
The 400,000-strong military force had strong Soviet influence on its values and many 
officers had strong affiliation with the communist party. During the communist regime, 
membership in the communist party was an “informal obligation” for all senior officers 
to achieve a successful career.131 
A reform tide of watchful eyes was thus quickly introduced to depoliticize and 
redefine the values in the PAF. First, all potentially dangerous elements of communist 
influence in the PAF were disbanded. In 1989, about 68 military units were disbanded 
and another 147 units were reorganized,132 although these efforts could also be attributed 
to the need for arms reduction under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces. Second, 
the government amended the law on professional military service from 1970 to prohibit 
military personnel from belonging to any political party, association, or trade union. In 
addition, active duty personnel could not be members of the national or local parliaments 
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and similar public institutions.133 Third, the PAF allowed the freedom of religion 
practices in the military, which was discouraged during the communist regime.134 
E. CHANCE EVENTS   
One of the chance events that influenced the defense reforms in Poland was the 
“Drawsko affair” in September 1994. At the official dinner in the Drawsko training 
grounds, the high-ranking officers pledged their allegiance to the Chief of General Staff 
and requested the civilian Minister of Defense to step down in the presence of the 
President and the Minister. Despite parliamentary investigation and condemnation of 
military interference in politics by the politicians, the Minister of Defense was forced into 
retirement.135 The incident eventually resulted in the collapse of the government and 
within the next few years, a reform tide of watchful eyes swept the country.  
On December 14, 1995, the Polish parliament passed the Bill on the Office of 
Minister of Defense. The new law segregated the competencies and responsibilities 
between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. In addition, the General 
Staff became part of the MOD, and the Chief of General Staff was subordinated to the 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.136 In 1997, the Small Constitution of 1992 was 
replaced by the Big Constitution, which decreed that the PAF shall observe neutrality 
regarding political matters and be subjected to civilian control. In addition, the 
President’s powers had been limited, although he remained the Supreme Commander-in-
Chief of the PAF. During peacetime, the President’s duties would be discharged through 
the Minister of Defense.137 This marked the completion of the democratic transformation 
of national defense in Poland. 
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The September 11th incident in 2001 was another chance event that had 
significant influence on the defense reforms in Poland. Prior to 2001, the responsibilities 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and MOD were clearly divided into internal and 
external security, respectively. As per most new democracies, Poland put in place 
constitutions to ensure that the PAF would not be allowed to perform internal policing 
roles.138 After the September 11th incident in 2001, Poland came to the realization that a 
silo approach to national security would not be relevant in the new environment.  
In July 2003, Poland approved the national security strategy that provided an 
integrated approach to responding to new threats such as international terrorism and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Polish parliament blurred the line of 
distinction between an external and internal security matter as it redefined the 
organizational framework for inter-agency security cooperation in responding to 
asymmetric threats or civilian crises. In addition, the national security strategy reiterated 
the importance of Poland’s role in international collaboration, especially with NATO.139 
In 2003, Poland participated in the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom, which 
subsequently became a political force for defense reforms. 
April 10, 2010 was a tragic day for the PAF. The crash of a Polish Air Force Tu-
154 aircraft in Western Russia killed all 96 people onboard who were travelling to attend 
an event to commemorate the Katyn massacre of Polish officers during World War II. 
Among the list of causalities included the President, Commander-in-Chief of the PAF, 
Chief of General Staff, Chief of Joint Operational Headquarters, Commanders of the 
three armed services, Special Forces Commander, the Warsaw Garrison Commander, 
Deputy Defense Minister for International Affairs, two former defense ministers, and a 
number of retired generals. The sudden loss of the country’s top military and political 
leaders would have an impact on the ongoing transformation in the PAF. In particular, 
analysts viewed that the Polish Land Forces would be affected the most, as its 
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commander was in the post for six months before the accident and had recently finalized 
the definition phase for the major restructuring of the Land Forces.140 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
Since its independence, Poland has maintained clear directions on its foreign 
policy and national security strategyto integrate with the Euro-Atlantic alliances. 
Defense reforms in the 1990s were thus focused on democratization of the PAF to fulfill 
the criteria for accession to NATO and the EU. Despite some challenges in reform 
efforts, Poland met the membership requirements and joined NATO and the EU in 1999 
and 2004 respectively. Having become a full member of the Euro-Atlantic alliances, 
Poland launched a new phase of defense reform to transform the PAF to deal with 
increasing international peacekeeping operations and new security threats after the 9-11 
incident. However, the rising cost of operations coupled with a prolonged global 
economic recession forced Poland to review its national security strategy and the long-
term modernization plans for the PAF.  
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VI. DEFENSE REFORM IN UKRAINE 
A. COUNTRY PROFILE   
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became an independent 
state on August 24, 1991. This marked the beginning of a difficult period for the 
Ukrainians, as the progress of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy was disrupted by the legacy of state control and endemic corruption. The 
government liberalized prices to combat widespread product shortages, while at the same 
time it implemented loose monetary policies to subsidize state-run industries and 
agriculture. This resulted in hyperinflation in the early 1990s. The lack of structural 
economic reform and continued heavy dependence on Russia to meet its energy needs 
have also made Ukraine vulnerable to external shocks. Prices finally stabilized after the 
introduction of the new currency—the Hryvnia in 1996.  
In Ukraine’s first six years of independence, other than downsizing efforts, there 
were hardly any signs of defense reforms. The period between 1996 and 2004 was 
described as the second phase of defense reform in Ukraine. The government called for 
changes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to better meet the requirements of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, which was started in February 1994. However, 
many analysts described these changes as lip service to appease the Western powers, as 
the plans for reform were not being carried out.141 In 2004, a peaceful “Orange 
Revolution” rocked the nation due to a rigged presidential election. The new government, 
elected under an internationally monitored vote, launched the third phase of defense 
reforms, which finally brought about real changes to the national defense in Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, the reform progress was disrupted by constant disputes by political 
leadership and decreasing budgetary support towards the end of 2000.  
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Between 2000 and 2007, Ukraine recorded a 7.5% average annual GDP growth 
rate due to strong export-based growth and domestic demand.142 In the following two 
years, Ukraine was badly affected by the global economic crisis. In November 2008, 
Ukraine had to take a $16.4 billion Stand-By Arrangement from the International 
Monetary Fund, and the economy eventually recovered in the first quarter of 2010. 
Ukraine is currently ranked 54th in the world in terms of GDP and the World Bank 
classifies it as a “middle-income economy.”143 
B. POLITICAL FORCES   
Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has faced a geopolitical triangle dilemma 
on whether to be part of the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasia, or remain as a neutral state.144 As the 
second largest country in Europe located west of Russia, analysts view Ukraine as the 
one of the linchpins of stability in Europe. As Zbigniew Brzezinski commented, “It 
cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, 
but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an 
empire.”145  
Ukraine thus faces intense economic and political pressure from Russia. First, the 
Ukrainian economy depends solely on Russia to meet about three-fourths of its annual 
gas consumption and 100% of its nuclear fuel needs.146 Second, the questioning of 
Ukraine’s rights to Crimea and insisting control over the port in Sevastopol signaled 
Russia’s unwillingness to recognize Ukraine’s borders in the initial years after the Cold 
War. Perhaps for these reasons, Ukraine, together with Russia and Belarus, co-founded 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991.  
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On the other hand, some political elites in Ukraine viewed integration with the 
Euro-Atlantic as a means to provide the required security coverage within a collective 
defense structure and reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia. In February 1994, Ukraine 
became the first CIS country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Ukraine 
participated in its first NATO peacekeeping operations by deploying 400 mechanized 
troops to Bosnia in December 1995. Ukraine’s vague directions in foreign policy and 
defense strategy were reflected in its first national security document—”The Foundations 
of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy” in 1993.147 Due to a lack of strategic guidance, Ukraine did 
not introduce any major defense reform in the first half of the 1990s, except for the 
downsizing and minimal depoliticizing of the UAF. These will be elaborated in the latter 
sections under ‘Internal Forces’ and ‘Socio-Economic Forces,’ respectively. 
By 1996, the UAF was described as a “bloated, grossly underfinanced 
establishment of 400,000, lacking an authoritative, coherent and realistic scheme of 
transformation and development.”148 Recognizing that the state of the UAF was 
becoming an obstacle to the integration with the Euro-Atlantic, as well as the increasing 
criticisms from Western states on the lack of efforts to improve the UAF’s 
interoperability with NATO forces, the political elites and the media in Ukraine called for 
defense reforms. From 1996 to 2004, Ukraine entered into a long period of rationalizing 
its defense reforms.  
On June 28, 1996, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the Ukrainian Constitution, 
which established that the President is the Supreme Commander of the UAF, as well as 
defined the role of the UAF and basic military duties of the citizens. Six months later, the 
national security concept, which took a joint approach to national security, was approved. 
Following that, the “State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001–
2005” was developed to translate the national security concept into a reality. The State 
Program mandated civil-democratic control of the UAF, as well as the transformation of 
the UAF into a smaller force to deal with local war and small intensity conflicts. In June 
                                                 
147. Sergiy Maslovskyi, “National Security Issues and Defense Reform in Ukraine,” (U.S. Army War 
College, 2007, 8). 
148. Sergiy Gerasymchuk, “The Case of Ukraine: Legislative Provisions,” Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt Research Paper No. 1/7 (2007): 6.  
 68
2004, the military doctrine of Ukraine was also approved.149 Between 2001 and 2005, a 
total of thirty-seven laws were passed to prepare for the operation and reform of the UAF. 
Due to unrealistic targets and lack of financial support, the State Program was later 
supplemented by other plans.150 Nonetheless, these national security documents and laws 
had put in place the basic building blocks for the next phase of defense reform. 
During the same period, Ukraine received sustainable international engagement 
and support through the NATO-Ukraine cooperation. In 1997, the Joint Working Group 
on Defense Reform was established under the “Charter on a NATO-Ukraine Distinctive 
Partnership” to focus on issues such as civil military relations, defense planning and 
management, and reform of the UAF. In 2000, Ukraine ratified the Partnership for Peace 
Status of Forces Agreement. In the following year, Ukraine signed the Exchange of 
Classified Information Agreement and offered the Yavoriv Training Center in Western 
Ukraine for NATO exercises.151 In the same year, Ukraine participated in NATO’s 
Planning and Review Process and submitted its State Program 2001–2005 for NATO’s 
evaluation. Through the Distinctive Partnership, cooperation between NATO and 
Ukraine had moved from the formal exchange of ideas to a structured process of review 
and consultation.152  
In May 2002, Ukraine officially declared its intention to join NATO for the first 
time in history. Despite strained relations over Ukraine’s alleged transfer of defense 
equipment to Iraq, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was officially drawn up in 
consultation with NATO and approved by the NATO Council in November 2002. 
Cooperation intensified with the set up of the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv. Ukraine was 
also regularly invited to participate in NATO training courses and joint exercises. With 
the establishment of a new system of defense planning based on NATO standards, 
 
                                                 
149. Gerasymchuk, “The Case of Ukraine: Legislative Provisions,” 4–8. 
150. James Sherr, “Ukraine: The Pursuit of Defence Reform in an Unfavourable Context,” Central & 
Eastern Europe Series 04/08 (2004): 6, accessed November 14, 2010, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/04-26-JGS.pdf.  
151. Leonid I. Polyakov, “U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability,” Strategic 
Studies Institute (2004): 10. 
152. Sherr, “Ukraine: The Pursuit of Defence Reform in an Unfavourable Context,” 11. 
 69
Ukraine conducted its first formal defense review in 2003–2004. The review findings and 
recommendations were captured in the Strategic Defense Bulletin and presented to 
NATO at the 2004 Istanbul Summit.153  
The real defense reform finally reached the shores of Ukraine after the “Orange 
Revolution” in 2004 (refer to the section named ‘Chance Events’). At the end of 2005, a 
series of reform tides was launched with the “State Programme of Development of 
Armed Forces 2006–2011.” Unlike previous efforts, which were very much piecemeal 
and incremental, the UAF had concrete reform plans with clear strategic goals to carry 
out its long overdue reforms. However, the progress was less than desired due to several 
reasons.  
First, there were insufficient resources to achieve the goals laid out in the State 
Program. Since 2006, the UAF had not received the minimum funding required to fulfill 
the plans as prescribed in the State Program. In addition, the UAF had failed to receive 
the full funding as stipulated in the state budget. As shown in Table 2, the UAF had only 
received 82% of the total approved funding of UAH 39.4 billion for 2006–2009. Even if 
the Ukrainian government decides to increase the future budget to cover the 18% (or 
UAH 7.1 billion) shortfall for the last four years, the UAF would have only received 68% 
of the minimum funding required. Given an inflation rate of 9.1% to 25.2%, the actual 
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Note: All figures are in billion UAH, unless otherwise stated. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Minimum funding required as 
defined by MOD 9.9 13.1 17.3 17.5 57.8 
       
Approved funding as stipulated 
in the state budget (a) 7.6 9.1 9.9 12.8 39.4 
Actual funding (b) 6.4 8.1 9.5 8.3 32.3 
% funded (b/a) 84.2% 88.4% 96.2% 65.1% 82.0% 
Shortfall (a-b) 1.2 1.1 0.4 4.5 7.1 
       
Changes in actual funding 5.6% 26.1% 18.1% -12.5%  
Changes in inflation rate 9.1% 12.8% 25.2% 15.9%  
Table 2.   Defense Funding for the Ukrainian Armed Forces from 2006 to 2009154 
The underfunding not only delayed the transformation progress but also affected 
the operations and capabilities of the UAF severely. In 2006, the UAF could only finance 
50 percent of its planned combat training activities, as 67% of the budget went to the 
maintenance of personnel due to the reduced budget. In particular, “certain measures in 
training and logistic support of the Air Force could not be undertaken mainly due to 
insufficient and delayed funding.”155 The limited budget also made it impossible for the 
UAF to carry out planned procurement and modernization projects, refresh emergency 
rations, and implement the disposal of surplus and out-of-service munitions.156 In 
January 2009, the President deferred the transition of the UAF to an all-volunteer force to 
2015.157 
The declining budget also affected the progress of ammunitions and rocket 
propellant disposal. Between 2006 and 2009, Ukraine only managed to disband six out of 
the sixteen rocket and ammunition storage centers that were not required under the future 
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structure of the UAF.158 This resulted in additional financial burden on the UAF and 
raised safety concerns, as the UAF resumed the practice of using outdated munitions for 
training, despite the fact that such practices were abandoned after two major missile 
disasters in 2000 and 2001.159 Raising his concern on the severity of the problem, the 
Ukrainian Defense Minister highlighted that “if funding for the national arms 
development programs is not increased radically, in a couple of years we (Ukraine) will 
be unable to defend our air space and perform our basic military functions.”160 
The lack of an effective and stable working government was another obstacle for 
the UAF, as defense reforms had become “hostage to political infighting, coalition 
building and constitutional wrangling amongst the major political parties and actors in 
Ukraine.”161 During the 2006 parliamentary crisis, there were major disagreements 
between the parties on Ukraine’s integration with the Euro-Atlantic and the goals of 
defense reforms. This eventually led to the replacement of the civilian Defense Minister, 
who had strengthened the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the General 
Staff, as well as created institutional improvements in the UAF under his watch.162 The 
political stalemate also resulted in the cancellation of Exercise Sea Breeze 2006, a major 
bilateral exercise between Ukraine and the U.S. to increase the UAF’s combat 
efficiency.163 This was because the parliament failed to come to an agreement to 
authorize foreign troops on Ukrainian soil for the proposed exercise.  
The political disputes, especially the foreign policy rift between the President and 
the Prime Minister, had led to the Ukrainian public’s confusion about NATO. Shortly 
after the 2006 parliamentary election, the newly appointed Prime Minister, 
Viktor Yanukovych, announced to the Ukrainian-NATO commission that Ukraine would 
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suspend negotiations on membership in the alliance, citing insufficient public support—
survey results showed that 60 percent of Ukrainians were against membership in 
NATO.164 In comparison, only 40 percent of Ukrainians were against joining NATO in a 
poll conducted in 2004.165  
In 2008, Yulia Tymoshenko, who took over the Prime Minister appointment from 
Yanukovych, reversed Ukraine’s position on NATO membership and sent a letter to 
request a Membership Action Plan at the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. 
However, the request was rejected, which brought about greater disappointment and 
disunity in Ukraine over its membership in NATO. This was evidenced by the dispute 
between the President and Prime Minister Tymoshenko over Ukraine’s response to the 
Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008. Prime Minister Tymoshenko criticized the 
President’s strong support for Georgia and broke away from the coalition. This led to the 
2008 parliamentary crisis, which saw the fifth government in Ukraine since the Orange 
Revolution.  
Despite these issues that have threatened to derail the defense reform efforts, 
Ukraine has made considerable progress in the following areas over the past six years:166 
a. Organizational Structure – Through the reform tide of scientific 
management, the UAF has successfully reorganized into the modern three-service 
structure with the completion of the merger between the Air Force and Air Defense in 
May 2005. This was a long process, with a total of thirty-seven laws passed from 2001 to 
2005. In 2006, the manning of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, which was established 
primarily for international peacekeeping operations deployment, was completed. Over the 
course of the following three years, the UAF set up their Special Operations Forces and 
the Military Medical Department. To allow the UAF to focus on its core functions, 
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Ukraine created the State Department of Surplus Materiel and Land to take over the 
responsibility for the sale of land and excess or decommissioned munitions. In terms of 
downsizing efforts, the UAF has achieved the target of reducing the force size from 
245,000 personnel in 2005 to 200,000 in 2009. 
b. Democratic Control – Ukraine has broke away from the Soviet model of 
appointing a military officer as Defense Minister and settled into a pattern of civilian 
defense leadership with the reform tide of watchful eyes.167 Since 2005, the Defense 
Minister and his deputies have all been civilians. This had a positive effect on the 
relations between the Ukrainian parliament’s Defense Committee and the Ministry of 
Defense, which allowed the latter to make a case for a budgetary increase in 2006 to 
cover the costs of reform.168 In addition, Ukraine has legally regulated and separated the 
functions and powers between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to align to 
the standards and structure of NATO nations. As stated in the opening address of White 
Book 2007 by the Defense Minister of Ukraine,  
…the General Staff will be in charge of purely military matters, the most 
important of which is optimizing forces strength, increasing 
professionalism, and defining modern types of arms and military 
equipment for the Armed Forces 2011 Model. The main efforts of the 
Defense Ministry will be concentrated on comprehensive support to 
Armed Forces’ requirements, forces activities and resolving the block of 
social-economic problems that accumulated over recent years.169  
c. Military Training – In the last five years, Ukraine has launched the reform 
tide of liberation management to improve the quality of military education and training in 
the UAF. The UAF has been leveraging multinational exercises as an effective form of 
combat training. Given a limited budget, training priority was given to the Joint Rapid 
Reaction Forces, which signaled Ukraine’s desire to continue to be an active participant 
in international peacekeeping operations. Since 1992, the UAF have deployed about 
34,000 personnel in eighteen international peacekeeping operations. As of the end of 
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2009, Ukraine has also established a military education network consisting of two 
universities, four academies, four institutes, three military science departments, fifteen 
military arts divisions, fifteen disaster medicine and military medicine divisions, three 
colleges, one military science section, one military lyceum, and one navy lyceum. To 
ensure interoperability between the UAF and NATO forces, the concept of personnel 
language training based on NATO “STANAG-6001” was approved on June 1, 2009. A 
database was also put in place to track English proficiency of the UAF personnel.170 
d. Personnel Management – The UAF has introduced a system of manning 
on a contract basis and set up twenty-five territorial contract manning centers to manage 
the transition from a partial conscript-based force to a fully professional force by 2015. 
To improve motivation and the attractiveness of military service, the UAF implemented 
initiatives such as increasing remuneration packages, providing military housing and 
other welfare support, establishing the Council of the families of Service personnel, and 
conducting military-patriotic education in schools. Promoting personnel with 
qualifications and peacekeeping mission experiences has also provided motivation for 
others to improve their qualifications and participate in international peacekeeping 
missions. Under the Armed Forces Personnel Policy concept in 2009, a centralized 
personnel management system was rolled out on January 1, 2010, to oversee personnel 
management and career development in the UAF. The reform tide of liberation 
management is expected to continue in the coming years as the UAF seek to fulfill the 
goal of an all-volunteer military force. 
Political forces have and will continue to play an important role in influencing 
defense reforms in Ukraine. Since the 2010 presidential election, there have already been 
changes to Ukraine’s foreign policy and national security strategy. In June 2010, the 
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forbids Ukraine's membership in any military bloc, though cooperation with alliances 
such as NATO will continue. Nonetheless, integration with the EU still remains a priority 
in Ukraine’s national security strategy.171 
C. INTERNAL FORCES   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a massive military force 
equipped with a huge nuclear arsenal. These included “780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, 
about 7,000 combat armored vehicles, 1,500 combat aircrafts, more than 350 ships, 1,272 
strategic nuclear warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 2,500 tactical nuclear 
missiles.”172 However, there was no command and control structure in place to provide 
strategic guidance, as neither the Ministry of Defense nor the General Staff existed.  
The newly created UAF in the early years of independence was described as force 
grouping, “designed for one purpose: to wage combined arms, coalition, offensive (and 
nuclear) warfare against NATO on an external front and under Moscow’s direction. They 
were not equipped, deployed or trained to defend Ukraine. They were bone and muscle 
without heart or brain.”173 More importantly, the economic reality was that Ukraine 
would not have the resources to sustain the military force and equipment that were left 
behind by the Soviets. Faced with a weak economy coupled with hyperinflation and 
product shortages in the 1990s, the UAF was very much “left to reform itself as it saw fit, 
within the framework of shrinking budgets.”174 Thus, Ukraine was ready to hop onto any 
initiatives that would lead to the reform tide of war on waste.  
In May 1992, Ukraine signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty together with 
the U.S., Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Under the treaty, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan agreed to give up all nuclear weapons to Russia for disposal and join 
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the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to become a non-nuclear weapon state. Ukraine 
ratified the treaty in 1994 and fulfilled its obligation in November 2001.175 In July 1992, 
Ukraine also signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces and agreed to reduce 
defense spending and force size to meet the troops ceiling limits on the amount of 
conventional armaments as established under the treaty.176  
By 1996, the size of the UAF had been reduced to about half of the personnel 
levels of 1991, from 780,000 to about 400,000 personnel. Other initiatives that the UAF 
undertook to reduce operating costs include closing as well as converting bases, 
conducting training near the homes of conscripts to reduce transportation and possibly 
accommodation costs, cancelling training programs, and shortening the serving period for 
conscripts. A pure cost-cutting exercise without consideration of the missions and 
structure of the UAF in a changed security environment resulted in a military force with 
outdated functions and capabilities, and demoralized personnel that were not deployable 
to defend Ukraine in the 1990s.  
Besides taking over the military force and equipment that were left on Ukraine’s 
soil after the end of Cold War, Ukraine also inherited one-third of the Soviet defense 
industry, consisting of 1,840 companies and research centers with 1.5 million 
employees.177 This represented a huge economic potential for Ukraine as some facilities 
had unique capabilities in ships, tanks, aircraft avionics, rockets, and missiles production. 
It was estimated that the Ukrainian defense industry would have a potential of USD 8–10 
billion annually, although an estimated amount of USD 28 billion of investment would be 
required for restructuring.178 Shutting down the industry would result in loss of economic 
opportunities and a huge unemployment problem.  
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Despite the challenges, Ukraine embarked on the reform tides of war on waste 
and scientific management to focus on building up niche areas within its defense 
industry. In 2007, the government announced that the number of state-owned companies 
under the control of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry would be reduced from 213 to 48 in 
2011. This would be carried out through consolidation, privatization, and transfers to 
other government agencies.179 Notable achievements from the Ukrainian defense 
industries include the Ukrainian-built T-84 main battle tank and the military 
reconnaissance and transport aircrafts, both produced by state-owned firms, Malyshev 
Factory and Antonov respectively, and currently in service. Today, Ukraine still remains 
a leader in missile-related technology.180 
D. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES   
Except for a short-lived period of independence from 1917 to 1920, Ukraine was 
under the control of other nations throughout history. This resulted in ethnic, socio-
economic and geo-cultural differences across the Ukrainian regions. In particular, the 
Russian community made up 17.3% of the population, as Ukraine came under the control 
of the Russian Empire, and subsequently the Soviet Union, in the latter part of the 18th 
century.181 Thus, a major concern for Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
was the possibility of spillover problems from any religious and ethnic conflicts emerging 
in neighboring countries. In addition, given Ukraine’s geographical position between 
Western and Eastern Europe, it could be easily drawn into political and economic crises 
in the region.182  
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Having inherited a military force with a deeply rooted communist ideology and 
values from the former Soviet Union, Ukraine launched a reform tide of watchful eyes to 
depoliticize the UAF. Besides setting up a legislative basis and institutional and 
command structures, Ukraine devised norms for the UAF to preserve coherence in the 
troops. In addition, Ukraine repatriated 12,000 military personnel who refused to pledge 
an oath of allegiance to the country and demobilized over 300,000 military personnel.183 
However, these reforms were more of a political factor rather than an attempt to address 
the country’s real security needs, as the focus of the political elites was on internal 
politics and economic issues.184  
E. CHANCE EVENTS 
The Orange Revolution in 2004 reflected the Ukrainians’ desire for justice and 
democracy. More importantly, the political elites had recognized the need for an effective 
national security policy to “protect national interests, guarantee security of individual, 
societal and state levels from external and internal threats.”185 In the aftermath of the 
Orange Revolution, presidential powers were reduced with the shift from a presidential 
system to a parliamentary system to encourage cross-party cooperation and transparency 
in policy-making, including national defense and security.186 Under the amended 
Constitution, the President is confined to appointing the Prime Minister, Defense 
Minister, and Foreign Minister, subject to the approval of parliament.  
The new government also provided clear directions on the ultimate goal of its 
foreign policy and military doctrine, which was the eventual membership in NATO and 
the EU. Implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan and the Ukraine-EU Action 
Plan thus became the priorities in driving the defense reforms in the UAF. In 2005, the 
“State Programme of Development of Armed Forces 2006–2011” was rolled out on 
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December 9, 2005. The revised State Program was jointly developed by the Ukrainian 
parliament, Central Office of the National Defense Council, the Ministry of Defense and 
the General Staff, in consultation with the experts from NATO nations and the Defense 
Planning Division of NATO’s International Staff.187 More importantly, the State 
Program laid out detailed objectives with clear timelines for training and capability 
development.  
In 2006, the President and the Minister of Defense respectively approved “The 
Strategic Concept” and “The Strategic Plan of the Employment of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine” as a supplement to the State Program. These two documents provided a new 
standard for strategic planning and military training for the commanders at different 
levels based on the different scenarios of possible military threats to Ukraine. However, 
the progress of implementing the State Program has been less than desired due to factors 
mentioned in earlier sections. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Political forces played an important role in driving defense reforms in Ukraine. In 
the 1990s, no major defense reform was carried out in the UAF due to lack of consensus 
on both foreign policy and national security strategy. Real defense reform came about 
after the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, when the new government provided clear 
directions on the ultimate goal of its foreign policy and military doctrineto join the 
Euro-Atlantic. However, the progress of defense reform was affected by the lack of 
funding support and the constant political disputes within the government. After the 2010 
presidential election, Ukraine made changes to its foreign policy and national security 
strategy. In the light of these changes and the economic burden caused by the prolonged 
financial crisis, Ukraine is expected to review the plans of its defense reform in the near 
future. 
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VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE REFORMS  
This chapter analyzes the similarities and differences in defense reforms among 
Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The chapter examines emerging 
trends in defense reforms for transitioning countries in Central and Eastern Europe and 
analyzes these trends in a comparative framework. The end of the chapter provides an 
evaluation of the model developed in Chapter II for analyzing defense reforms.  
A. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic faced similar challenges after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The top three challenges in the early years of nation 
building revolved around how best to transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy, implement the democratization process, and manage the massive 
military force and equipment that were inherited from the Soviets. More importantly, the 
governments had to make two important decisions that would have a significant impact 
on the direction and pace of reform. First, the prioritization of the urgency to tackle 
economic versus national security and defense issues would have an impact on the 
allocation of resources for defense reforms. Second, foreign policy position with respect 
to political, economic, and security relations towards the Western nations and Russia 
would provide different ideas and objectives in shaping the defense reforms of each 
country.  
Based on the research of the defense reforms for the four countries, the author 
observed that Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic went through a similar 
pattern of defense reform, with differing paces and results that were dependent on the 
unique political environment, foreign and security policy objectives, and socio-economic 
pressures for each country. In the first phase of defense reform, these countries focused 
on reducing excess or unnecessary components of their armed forces under the reform 
tide of war on waste. One major cost-cutting initiative that was observed across the four 
countries was the drastic downsizing of the armed forces. See Table 3 for the changes in 
armed forces personnel strength from 1994 to 2009.  
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% Change from 
Country 1994 2000 2009 1994 to 2000 2000 to 2009 
Bulgaria  98,930   79,658  31,250 -19% -61% 
Czech Republic  92,893   57,735  37,739 -38% -35% 
Poland  269,670   205,270  131,898 -24% -36% 
Ukraine  495,156   310,000  148,000 -37% -52% 
Average -30% -46% 
Table 3.   Changes in Armed Forces’ Personnel Strength188 
Between 1994 and 2000, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic 
reduced the personnel strength of their armed forces by 30 percent on average. This 
translated to about a 4 percent cut in headcount per annum over seven years. The reform 
tide of war on waste did not slow down in the 2000s. From 2000 to 2009, the armed 
forces of the four countries saw annual reductions of about 5 percent in their personnel 
strength. However, more than often, these downsizing and cost-cutting efforts were 
accompanied by the reform tide of watchful eyes, with initiatives like the depoliticizing 
of the armed forces and the redefinition of the roles and responsibilities between the 
civilian-ministry and military departments. This was of utmost priority for countries 
seeking to integrate with NATO or the EU, as putting in place democratic standards of 
civilian control over the armed forces and the defense budget is one of the most important 
criteria for Euro-Atlantic membership. 
In the second phase of defense reform, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech 
Republic assessed options for strengthening the defense management and modernization 
of their armed forces through the reform tides of scientific management and liberation 
management. These reform tides were launched because of pressures from internal forces 
and political forces. For Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic, their plans to 
modernize their armed forces evolved after joining NATO. Faced with increasing 
operations and having served alongside other NATO forces in multinational 
peacekeeping operations, Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic realized that their 
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armed forces were lacking in many areas. Language, as well as outdated doctrines, 
strategies and equipment, became key concerns for these three countries. As a result, 
Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic launched reform initiatives that targeted 
improving their interoperability with NATO and allied forces. However, their plans were 
somewhat affected by the declining budgetary support in the latter half of the 2000s, 
which will be elaborated on in subsequent paragraphs. As for Ukraine, political force was 
the push factor, as the Ukrainian government then realized that the state of the UAF had 
become an obstacle to its integration with Euro-Atlantic. After six years of downsizing 
without any strategic consideration of future structure and requirements, the UAF was in 
a terrible state with demoralized personnel that were lacking in both military training and 
equipment in a new security environment. From 1996 to 2004, Ukraine entered into a 
long period of rationalizing its defense reforms to transform the UAF.  
 
Figure 3. Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP from 1994 to 2009189 
Figure 3 shows defense spending as a percent of GDP for Bulgaria, Poland, 
Ukraine and the Czech Republic from 1994 to 2009. The first observation was that there 
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was a general downward trend from 1994 to 2009 for all four countries with the 
exception of Ukraine, where its downward trend only started after 1997. This was despite 
an upward trend for GDP growth, especially during the economic boom in the late 1990s 
till the mid 2000s. See Figure 4 for the annual percent GDP growth for the four countries 
from 1994 to 2009.  
 
Figure 4. Annual Percent GDP Growth from 1994 to 2009190 
This downward trend of defense spending as a percent of GDP was also observed 
for countries such as Hungary and Albania, which had larger armed forces and 
independence during the Cold War.191 The general downward trend could be explained 
by the reform tide of war on waste that had consistently swept the four countries, as 
evidenced in their defense reforms. Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic 
realized that there was no requirement and financially not sustainable to maintain a huge 
military force after the end of the Cold War. In addition, they were obligated to reduce 
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their defense spending and force size to meet the troops ceiling and limits on the amount 
of conventional armaments as established under the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces.192 
Another observation was that the commitment to join NATO had a positive 
effect on defense spending, although not sustainable after accession to the alliance. 
From Figure 3 earlier, it is observed that Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic 
increased their defense spending, or at least maintained it at around 2 percent of GDP, as 
they sought membership into NATO. Their defense spending gradually declined after 
attaining NATO membership, especially for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1999 
and 2004, respectively. Thereafter, their defense spending as a percent of GDP went on a 
downward trend, as other competing domestic requirements took priority. In the case of 
the Czech Republic, defense spending has drastically fallen from 2.0 percent of GDP in 
2005 to 1.32 percent in 2010, as the country faced the economic consequences of the 
catastrophic floods in the first half of the 2000s, followed by the global economic 
recession in the latter half of the 2000s. In Bulgaria, the Ministry of Defense was unable 
to fund many of its planned modernization projects and had to defer or put these plans on 
hold due to the prolonged economic crisis, coupled with the mismanagement of financial 
resources. 
With regard to the increasing trend of defense spending as a percent of GDP for 
Ukraine prior to 1997, it is noted that the increase in the budget was minimal from USD 
1.3 billion in 1994 to USD 1.5 billion in 1996 as shown in Figure 5. The big increase to 
USD 2.1 billion in 1997 coincided with the beginning of the second phase of defense 
reform in Ukraine, as well as the cooperation with NATO under the “Charter on a 
NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership.” Following that, Ukraine’s defense spending 
went on an upward trend as shown in Figure 5. However, defense spending as a percent 
of GDP was on a downward trend from 3.6% in 1999, when Ukraine’s economy turned 
around, to an average of 2.8% between 2001 and 2009.  
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Figure 5. Ukraine Defense Spending (in USD billion) from 1994 to 2009193 
Figure 6 shows the expenditure on military equipment as a percent of defense 
spending for Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic after their accession to NATO. It 
can be seen that the Czech Republic’s proportion of defense spending on equipment has 
been on a steep downward trend since joining NATO in 1999. As for Bulgaria and 
Poland, the trend is relatively flat, with signs of gradual decline in recent years. From 
these observations, one might possibly question the three countries’ commitment on 
defense modernization. Given a limited budget, transformation efforts would probably be 
focused on those critical forces participating in NATO and other peacekeeping 
operations. It is noted that the 2010 defense budget for Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech 
Republic (1.32%) remained below NATO’s desired level of 2 percent of GDP at 
1.44%,194 1.32%195 and 1.95%196, respectively.  
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Figure 6. Equipment Expenditure as a Percent of Defense Spending197 
Among the different reform forces, political force was one of the most 
important drivers of defense reform in Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech 
Republic. In several cases, despite the repeated calls and signals for urgent change in the 
armed forces by internal forces, defense reform was not rolled out due to political neglect 
and disputes. This was apparent especially in the early 1990s. Defense reform only came 
about when the political elites agreed that change was required to fulfill certain agenda, 
such as to meet the criteria for membership in NATO or improve interoperability with 
allied forces. Hence, political stability is an important requirement for defense reform. In 
addition, while political forces determine the direction of defense reforms, political will 
backed with resource commitment is equally crucial to achieve the desired outcomes of 
the defense reforms.  
The involvement of international actors, such as NATO and the U.S., has a 
positive effect on the pace of defense reform. The NATO officials who worked closely 
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with the aspiring countries “served as catalysts to help these states restructure their 
militaries in accordance with democratic principles and to reshape their military postures 
for the future.”198 Through the Partnership for Peace Program and the Membership 
Action Plan, Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic gained insights on how to 
restructure their armed forces, update military doctrines and strategies, establish training 
standards, and conduct defense planning. In addition, participation in NATO exercises 
and peacekeeping operations has not only contributed to the professionalization of the 
participating units, but also created a positive trickle-down effect on the armed forces, as 
personnel are rotated into and out of the operations.199 Ukraine has benefitted from the 
NATO-Ukraine cooperation. The Joint Working Group on Defense Reform established 
under the “Charter on a NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership” in 1997 assisted Ukraine 
in addressing issues related to civil-military relations, defense planning and management, 
which led to the development of the State Program 2001–2005 for the reform of the UAF. 
It was through these interactions and co-operations with NATO members that allowed the 
political elites of these transitioning countries to see the real need for change in their 
armed forces.  
Another benefit from interacting with NATO was military assistance, especially 
from the U.S. Some key U.S. Foreign Military Assistance programs include the 
following: Foreign Military Financing, Economic Support Fund, International Military 
Education and Training, Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 
programs, and the Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. In 
the last three years, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic have received 
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Note: All figures are in USD thousands. 
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY2009 
Country Actual Estimate Request 
Bulgaria 11,059 8,502 11,000
Poland 30,528 28,980 29,200
Czech Republic 5,111 3,275 5,050
Ukraine 12,716 8,608 11,550
Total 59,414 49,365 56,800
Overall total average per year for the 
four countries 55,193 
Table 4.   United States Foreign Military Assistance Funding from 2007 to 2009200 
B. EMERGING TRENDS IN DEFENSE REFORMS 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine have been affected by the 
prolonged economic downturn that started in 2007. Except for Poland, GDP growth for 
the rest of the three countries fell below zero in 2009. This corresponded to a decline in 
defense spending as a percent of GDP as shown in Figure 3 earlier in this chapter. Across 
Europe, the aggregated figures for NATO countries (excluding the U.S.), non-NATO 
countries, and Russia revealed a similar trend as shown in Figure 7. As reported in the 
Military Balance 2010, of the twenty-four European members of NATO, only Norway 
and Denmark proposed an increase in their defense budgets in real terms compared to the 
prior year, with biggest cuts coming from the Czech Republic (-12%) and Romania (-
17.4%).201 In Russia, the former Deputy Defense Minister for Financial and Economic 
Matters revealed that defense funding for research and development projects have been 
drastically reduced, with reports indicating that three hundred projects were put on 
hold.202 The economies of the CIS countries were the worst hit in Europe. Most of them 
 
 
                                                 
200. United States Department of State, “Security Assistance: Countries A-Z,” accessed November 4, 
2010, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/c17570.htm. 
201. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010, 109. 
202. Ibid., 218. 
 90
are struggling with the aftermath of three simultaneous major shocks: the financial crisis; 
a drastic decline in export demand from advanced economies; and the fall in commodity 
prices, especially in the energy markets.203  
 
Figure 7. Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP in Europe204 
While some analysts viewed that the global recession was over in 2010, many 
agreed that the recovery would be a slow and prolonged process.205 In September 2010, 
billionaire investor Warren Buffett commented that the U.S. economy is still in recession 
and is “...not gonna be out of it for a while” until the economy returns to the pre-
downturn level.206 As countries continue to roll out discretionary fiscal measures to 
manage their deficits, there will be greater pressure to trim defense spending. In the 
absence of direct and immediate threats, downward pressure on defense spending is 
expected to continue in the next few years in Europe, especially for the transitioning 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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At the same time, deployments for international peacekeeping operations have 
been increasing in recent years as shown in Figure 8. It is more apparent in Figure 9 that 
the increasing trend started in 2002 after the 9/11 incident in 2001. In view of the global 
recession, it remains to be seen if this trend will continue. Additionally, support of the 
war in Afghanistan is fading in European countries due to intense public pressure.207 
Nonetheless, international peacekeeping deployments for the UN, NATO, and EU 
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Figure 9. Personnel Deployments by Top Five Deploying Organizations 
From 1999 to 2008209 
In view of limited resources and increasing operations, countries around the world 
have started exploring ways and means to use their defense dollars more effectively. The 
reform tide of war on waste is expected to continue as Central and Eastern Europe 
countries downsize into smaller armed forces. At the same time, their focus will be 
shifted towards the reform tide of scientific and liberation management to develop a 
smaller but flexible, responsive and professional military force to deal with 
asymmetric threats and be deployable for operations beyond the country’s borders. This 
is reflected in the military doctrines, strategies and defense reforms of Bulgaria, Poland, 
Ukraine and the Czech Republic. It is for this reason that many transitioning countries, 
including Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic, have chosen to join NATO. Member 
countries of NATO do not need to maintain huge armies but instead specialize in niche 
areas as part of their contribution to a collective defense structure. For example, the ACR 
has developed expertise in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
defense.210 
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The move towards smaller armed forces with role specialization will influence 
defense reforms and modernization plans. For example, professionalization and the move 
towards an all-volunteer military force has been one of the main themes in the defense 
reforms for the four countries. The Czech Republic was the first among the four countries 
to abolish conscription service in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Poland in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. As for Ukraine, it is currently a partial conscript-based force with 
plans to transform to a fully professional all-volunteer force by 2015. Many of the 
transitioning countries in Eastern Europe have also embarked on this route and abolished 
conscription service as shown in Table 5.  
 
Countries Year of Abolishing Conscription  
Hungary Peacetime conscription abolished in 2004 
Latvia Abolished in 2007 
Lithuania Suspended in 2008 
Macedonia Abolished in 2007 
Romania Abolished in 2006 
Slovakia Abolished in 2006 
Slovenia Abolished in 2003 
Table 5.   List of Eastern European Countries that Have Abolished Conscription211  
From an economic point of view, conscription is a social burden for a country. It 
is not cost-effective to build up the competencies and deploy conscripts for overseas 
peacekeeping given the time, resource and legal constraints. Maintaining a conscription 
service best succeeds if a country is facing an external threat. The other political reason 
for retaining mandatory military service would be more for the purpose of nation building 
and increasing employment opportunity. However, as more soldiers are deployed 
overseas for operations, the stronger the political pressure to shorten or totally remove 
conscription service and move towards an all-volunteer force.212 The Swiss Armed 
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Forces, which is organized based on the concept of the citizen in uniform, is facing 
increasing pressure from society to remove its conscription service. The Turkish Armed 
Forces, which is the largest military in NATO after the U.S., is also expecting to see 
changes to their conscription service within the next few years. Currently, the Turkish 
government is looking at restructuring the Turkish Armed Forces into “a smaller, more 
streamlined force relying less on conscripts” to meet its security requirements.213  
In order to use their defense dollars more effectively, countries around the world 
are becoming more open to best practices and innovative ideas from the private 
sector for application in their armed forces. The defense departments in Singapore, 
United Kingdom and the U.S. have already moved their non-core functions to a shared 
services provider model.214 Central and Eastern European countries have also started to 
evaluate changes to their procurement procedures and use outsourcing services from the 
private sector.215 To rationalize costs and avoid duplication of efforts, several European 
countries have closed down their military hospitals and transferred the capabilities to 
civilian hospitals.216 The reality is that personnel and budgetary constraints have left 
countries with no choice but to make greater use of the private sector to support their 
defense capabilities. One example is the increasing trend of applying innovative methods 
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Table 6.   Innovative Methods for Capability Development217 
The Czech Republic and Poland have both entered into joint procurement 
agreements with its allied partners to enable military capabilities at a lower cost. These 
include the Strategic Airlift Capability agreement and the establishment of the European 
Air Transport Fleet. Through joint procurement and sharing of niche capabilities, 
countries will be able to reap the benefits of economies of scale and reduce unnecessary 
duplication, maintenance costs, and the need for huge inventory of expensive military 
equipment. More importantly, such collaboration provides the “military substance to the 
political principle of collective security” in the alliance.218 
C. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL 
The proposed model of reform developed and described in Chapter II has been 
useful in analyzing and comparing the different forces of reforms, as well as the 
interconnectivity between them. The model also allows one to relate the desired goals and 
outcomes to the different forces of reforms. However, due to the close interconnectivity 
between the different forces, some degree of ambiguity is inevitable in categorizing the 
different forces of reform. One example is the question whether all the items under 
chance events are truly chance events.  For example, in the case of the “Drawsko affair,” 
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an outsider looking at Poland as a whole could classify the scandal as a chance event that 
shaped the reform initiatives following the aftermath of the incident. On the other hand, if 
one is looking more narrowly at the PAF, the pledge of allegiance by senior military 
officials could be viewed as a rather deliberate action and be categorized under political 
forces instead. In another example, the dysfunctional state of the armed forces is an 
internal force for change. However, if the political elites see this as an obstacle to their 
political objectives, for example, to join NATO, and initiate defense reforms to address 
these issues, one could classify these items under political forces for change. Hence, the 
decision on the classification of the different forces of reform depends on one's point of 
view.  More importantly, there is a need to maintain a consistent perspective when going 
through the analysis to decide on how to categorize the forces of reform. 
There are two possible areas of refinement in the model. One area is to expand the 
forces of reforms to include international forces. Currently, there are four categories of 
forces of reforms, namely political forces, socio-economic forces, internal forces and 
chance events. Through the exercise of categorizing the defense reforms for the selected 
four countries, the author found that international forces, such as NATO and the U.S., 
played a significant role in influencing and shaping the defense reforms in these 
countries. Having an additional category of forces of reform will allow the isolation of 
the influence by international forces on defense reform for better analyses.  
Another area that appears to be lacking in the model is the identification of key 
actors involved in the defense reforms. One would have to infer the champions and 
participants by examining the tides of reforms and tie back to their interests in specific 
reforms. As the analysis of the actors is not within the scope of this research, it is 
recommended that future studies be conducted to further explore this area. Nonetheless, 
the model has provided a structured process for use in the analysis of defense reforms. 
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Throughout history governments have been drumming the beat of public sector 
reform, including defense-related reforms. Light described these reforms as tides of 
reforms,219 with desired outcomes to reduce wastages, promote efficiencies, improve 
accountability, and enhance adaptability in government agencies. These reform tides are 
constantly shaped and influenced by different reform forces due to changing political 
environments, socio-economic conditions, internal pressures and unexpected events, 
which have significant impact on government, the public and even nations.  
Since the end of the Cold War, widespread defense reforms have been carried out 
in armed forces around the world, especially in countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. In the case of Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and 
the Czech Republic, these transitioning countries faced similar challenges in nation 
building after the fall of communism. They had to make two important decisions: 
allocation of scarce resources to address economic versus national security and defense 
issues, and foreign policy positions with respect to political, economic, and security 
relations towards the Western nations and Russia. These decisions provided different 
ideas and objectives in shaping each country’s national security and defense strategies, 
which had direct impacts on defense reforms. While the four countries went through a 
similar pattern of defense reform, their results and pace of reform varied, dependent upon 
the unique political environments, foreign and security policy objectives and the socio-
economic pressures in each country.  
Among the different reform forces, political force was one of the most important 
drivers of defense reform for Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech Republic. In the 
first phase of defense reform, the governments of the four countries focused on reducing 
excess or unnecessary components of the armed forces under the reform tide of war on 
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waste, as the threat of a traditional large-scale warfare disappeared after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. With NATO as the remaining military power in Europe, many analysts 
“…predicted NATO’s destiny of irrelevancy, if not total collapse.”220 More importantly, 
it was financially not sustainable to maintain a huge military force given the difficult 
economic conditions in the early 1990s, as the countries transitioned from centrally 
managed economies to open market economies. Concurrently, the four countries 
launched the reform tide of watchful eyes to depoliticize their armed forces and redefine 
the roles and responsibilities between the civilian-ministry and military departments. This 
was observed especially for governments seeking to integrate with NATO or the EU, 
although the reform tide of watchful eyes to provide greater accountability on the actions 
of the their armed forces tended to fade away once the strategic goal of joining NATO 
was achieved.  
In the second phase of defense reform, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine and the Czech 
Republic launched the reform tides of scientific management and liberation management 
in the 2000s. During this period, defense reform initiatives were targeted at strengthening 
defense management and modernization of the armed forces to deal with new security 
challenges, primarily after September 11, 2001. For Bulgaria, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic, defense reforms were driven by pressures from two reform forces‘political 
forces’ and ‘internal forces’ to improve interoperability with NATO and allied forces 
after their accession to the alliance. As for Ukraine, political force was the push factor, as 
the Ukrainian government realized that the state of the UAF had become an obstacle to 
its integration with Euro-Atlantic. Due to the global economic crisis and other competing 
national priorities, all four countries had to delay or cancel many of the reform initiatives 
in the face of declining budgetary support in the latter half of the 2000s. As these 
governments continue to roll out discretionary fiscal measures to manage their deficits, 
there will be greater pressure to trim defense spending. In the light of the changes in the 
political, economic and security climates, many countries, including Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic, have started to review their defense strategies and re-chart the course for 
reform and transformation of their armed forces. 
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Several other observations may be made from analyzing the defense reforms for 
the four countries. First, the commitment to join NATO has a positive effect on defense 
spending. However, the trend of increasing defense spending as a percent of GDP was 
not sustainable after Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic were granted full 
membership in the NATO alliance. Second, there exists a general downward trend in 
terms of defense spending as a percent of GDP from 1994 to 2009 for all four countries. 
This downward trend is expected to continue in view of the prolonged global recession. 
Third, the interaction and cooperation with international actors, such as NATO and the 
U.S., has a favorable effect on the pace of defense reform for all four countries. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
From the analysis of the four countries several conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the emerging trends for defense reforms over the next three to five years. 
 In the absence of direct and immediate threats, downward pressure on defense 
spending is expected to continue in Europe, especially for transitioning 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 International peacekeeping deployments for the UN, NATO and EU are 
projected to be maintained at the current level, or increase in the short run 
based on existing trends. 
 Central and Eastern European countries will continue to ride on the reform 
tide of the war on waste to downsize their armed forces given limited 
resources. Concurrently, greater focus will be on developing a smaller but 
more flexible, responsive, and professional military force through the reform 
tides of scientific management and liberation management.  
 Professionalization of the military and the move towards an all-volunteer 
military force that is capable of dealing with asymmetric threats and be 
deployable for multinational peacekeeping operations will be one of the main 
themes for defense reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 100
 Countries around the world have become and are becoming  more open to the 
idea of adopting best practices and innovative ideas from the private sector 
and applying them in their armed forces.  
To summarize, defense is defined as the military action or resources for protecting 
a country against potential adversaries.221 It is “…inseparable from political stability, 
economic success, and social harmony.”222 When threat is perceived to be lacking or 
uncertain, affordability becomes an important factor in the defense policy decision-
making process and in the allocation of national resources for defense. A current 
assessment of the security environment in Europe is that “… no state in the region 
considers its neighbors as potential opponents.”223 With a prolonged economic downturn, 
the question of guns versus butter will thus consistently be a topic of debate amongst 
governments, while their ministries of defense will have to restrategize how best to 
maximize their limited resources to achieve the goals of defense reforms.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several areas of recommended follow-up from this research. First, the 
model can be refined by expanding the categories of forces of reforms to include 
international forces’ influence on defense reforms. Second, the model can be tested with 
more case studies, especially for transitioning countries, both in Europe and other parts of 
the world, to verify if similar trends exist in their defense reforms. Third, indicators can 
be developed to compare and measure the different aspects of defense reforms between 
countries over time. Some possible criteria for use in this regard include a country’s 
willingness to spend on defense, invest in modernization, and contribute and participate 
in international peacekeeping missions. Finally, perhaps additional modifications to the 
proposed model can be explored to relate the key actors involved in defense reforms to 
the tides and forces of reform. 
                                                 
221. Princeton University, “Wordnet: An Electronic Lexical Database,” accessed November 12, 2010, 
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=defense.  
222. Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security 
Linkages in Asia-Pacific, (New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 1996), 28. 
223. No author, “White Paper on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria,” 4. 
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Figure 10. Structure of Bulgarian Land Forces in 2010224  
 
Figure 11. Structure of Bulgarian Land Forces by 2014225 
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Figure 12. Structure of Bulgarian Air Force in 2010226 
 
 
Figure 13. Structure of Bulgarian Air Force by 2014227 
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Figure 15. Structure of Bulgarian Navy by 2014229 
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